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FROM THE EFFECTS OF A PRICE WAR TO CROSS-CHAIN CANNIBALIZATION
Despite the huge amount of money allocated every year to sales promotions, brand
managers still do not know how often and in what circumstances promotions are truly
effective. This dissertation proposes an approach that allows managers to assess the
impact of individual promotion events rather than the average effect of total promotional
efforts. As such, more detailed information is gained on how promotions should be
implemented. 
Moreover, sales promotions are not only evaluated in a business-as-usual environment,
but their role and effectiveness during retailer induced price wars is also critically examined.
As retailer competition tends to degenerate more often into price wars, this research
offers recommendations to brand managers on whether they should accommodate
retailers’ wishes to lower regular, list prices rather than focusing on temporary promotions. 
Finally, a brand manufacturer, when planning his promotional events for a retailer,
should consider that a promotion can steal sales from rival supermarket chains. While
these cross-chain effects are often negligible for the retailer, they are quite substantial for
the manufacturer. Thus, to increase promotional effectiveness, a brand manager should
carefully plan the promotional calendar across rival retailers.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation of the thesis 
Consumers are continuously confronted with price promotions. Recent figures 
indicate that 24 percent of all Dutch supermarket purchases take place under some form of 
promotional support. In the US, purchases made under sales promotions comprise 38 
percent of all purchases in supermarkets (Steenkamp et al. 2005). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that considerable attention has been devoted to study the performance 
implications of price promotions (for a recent review, see van Heerde and Neslin 2008). 
These previous studies share a number of characteristics: 
(1) So far, promotion studies tend to deal with average effects. Steenkamp et al. 
(2005: 42), for example, say that “the unit of analysis is not an individual 
price promotion... Instead, our elasticities estimate whether on average...”. 
Therefore, it is harder to obtain detailed insights into effectiveness 
differences across different promotional implementations and contexts (even 
though some first attempts have been made in that direction by Cooper et al. 
1999 and Ailawadi et al. 2006). 
(2) Most research investigated promotional effectiveness in fairly stable 
business conditions (Bass and Pilon 1980, Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999). 
While Nijs et al. (2001) considered evolutionary settings as well, they did 
not consider intervening effects of major structural changes in the market 
environment, such as price wars. 
(3) While there has been considerable research on both the decomposition of the 
promotional sales bump (see e.g. Chiang 1991, Gupta 1988, van Heerde et 
al. 2003), and on the explanation of cross-brand and cross-category 
variability in promotional effectiveness (e.g. Nijs et al. 2001, Pauwels et al. 
2002, Srinivasan et al. 2004), limited attempts have been made to investigate 
cross-store effects. 
These observed commonalities in previous studies leave various areas for future 
research, to which we contribute in the following way: 
(1) In Chapter 2, we no longer consider average effects, but rather assess the 
effectiveness of individual promotions which differ widely in terms of 
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execution and support. In a two-step approach, we first determine the total 
sales effectiveness of each individual promotion and, in a second step, we 
relate each of these effects to various promotional implementation and 
contextual characteristics. 
(2) In Chapter 3, we relax the assumption of a "business-as-usual" scenario, and 
consider how a major disruption in the retailing landscape can affect the 
implementation and, most importantly, the effectiveness of price 
promotions. The major disruption we look at is the price war which started 
in the Netherlands in the Fall of 2003, and which lasted for more than two 
years. 
(3) Finally, in Chapter 4, we quantify the impact of cross-chain effects, and 
check whether a promotion by the leading retailer is able to significantly 
attract customers of competing retailers. While doing so, we verify whether 
this effect is symmetric across different retailer formats. 
To get empirical insights into the effectiveness of individual promotions, we study 
all promotional events of a multinational CPG manufacturer at four national retailers in the 
Dutch market, from the first week of 2001 to the end of 2005. The data cover promotions 
in eight different product categories, for forty different brands. The data we use are 
ACNielsen data combined with internal company data and Nielsen Media Research 
advertising data. 
1.2. Outline 
In the following pages, we briefly elaborate on each of the above-mentioned 
essays to provide an overview of the content of this thesis. The outline is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1. 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, we propose a new “individual promotion” approach to 
analyze promotional effectiveness. Existing literature on price promotions has focused on 
average effects. Therefore, it is harder to obtain detailed insights into differences in the 
individual effectiveness across different promotion implementations and contexts. 
This across-promotion variability is only partially reflected in prior academic 
research. Most studies focus on differences between brands and/or categories, while 
limited research explains differences within a given brand. In fact, any reference to 
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differences across promotion activity is generally absent, as in most aggregated time series 
approaches (e.g. Nijs et al. 2001), or limited to the moderation of the average effects of 
promotions by feature and/or display (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2000). An exception in this 
direction is the work of Ailawadi et al. (2006, 2007), which looks at the effectiveness of 
individual promotions from the point of view of the retailer, and which analyzes how the 
promotional effectiveness varies with promotional (e.g. discount depth, multi pack and 
feature) and/or contextual characteristics (e.g. market share, advertising, distribution, 
concentration, storability, size and type of the store, market demographics and competitive 
density). 
While we also look at the effectiveness of individual promotions, we take the 
point of view of the manufacturer, whose interests are not necessarily aligned with those of 
the retailers (Srinivasan et al. 2004). For a retailer, a promotion is more successful when it 
expands the category sales (Raju 1992). For a manufacturer, in contrast, a promotion is 
more successful when it increases the product sales, possibly at the expense of competing 
brands, without cannibalizing its own sales at other retailers (Srinivasan et al. 2004). 
Moreover, we extend the set of promotional descriptors. For example, we also take into 
account retail and brand competition, filtering out the simultaneous occurrence of a 
competitive action, as well as the recency from the previous promotion. Indeed, the effect 
of the same nominal price cut may differ depending on whether competitive products are 
promoted in the same week or in the weeks before at that retailer, and/or whether the same 
product has recently been on promotion with other retailers. 
In a two-step approach, we first determine the total sales effectiveness of each 
individual promotion using a multiple-break analysis. The model extends the intervention 
approach of Leone (1987) to multiple promotions, in line with the procedure developed by 
Ben-David and Papell (2000). With this approach, we calculate a net effect accounting also 
for factors such as deceleration and stockpiling. Moreover, unlike Ailawadi et al. (2006), 
we control for potentially intervening effects of advertising and/or competitive actions. In 
the second step, we subsequently relate the total sales effectiveness of each promotion 
estimated in the previous step to various promotion implementation (e.g. timing, framing. 
and communication) and contextual (e.g. retailer, brand and category characteristics) 
characteristics. 
Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, we apply the method proposed in Chapter 2 to study the 
effectiveness of sales promotion during a price war, a business scenario largely ignored in 
the promotional literature. In fact, despite the increasing number of price wars, little is 
known about their consequences on marketing activities and marketing performance. The 
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extant literature has mainly provided a definition of the phenomenon (e.g. Heil and Helsen 
2001) and the conditions leading to a price war (e.g. Fabra and Toro 2005, Busse 2002, 
Elzinga and Mills 1999, Levenstein 1997). However, "direct research on price wars in 
marketing is lacking" (Heil and Helsen 2001: 87). Up to now, the only empirical work in 
the field is the research of van Heerde et al. (2008) on the effects of a price war among 
grocery retailers on store choice and basket size. So far, no study has investigated the 
effects of price wars on promotional effectiveness. Also, the majority of the price war 
literature has focused on the consequences for the initiator of the price war and his 
competitors, ignoring the effects on a third party, i.e. the manufacturers. 
In this essay, we relax the assumption of a "business-as-usual" scenario, and 
consider how a major disruption in the retailing landscape affects the effectiveness of price 
promotions. The major disruption we look at is the price war that started in the Netherlands 
in the fall of 2003 (van Heerde et al. 2008). Instead of looking at the impact on the retailers 
directly involved in the price war, we focus on what happens to the brands of the 
manufacturers. 
Furthermore, we distinguish two settings: one where the price of the brand itself is 
not reduced during the price war (indirect price-war effect), and one where the brand is 
directly involved in the permanent price cuts (direct price-war effect). During these two 
regimes, price promotions may stimulate sales in different ways. 
Indeed, a price war can have several potential implications for the effectiveness of 
price promotions. First, there have been many statements in the popular press that 
promotion frequency and depth tend to be reduced because of the price war (e.g. see De 
Financiële Telegraaf for reports on the Dutch price war, “Prijzenoorlog in de 
supermarkten” 2004, 2005, 2006). As promotion frequency and depth of the discount have 
been found to be key determinants of promotional effectiveness (e.g. Nijs et al. 2001, Mela 
et al. 1997), this already suggests that price wars may affect the usefulness of price 
promotions. Second, due to the high media coverage that typically accompanies a price 
war, customers are expected to pay increased attention to the price dimension (Sloot and 
van Aalst, 2005). Van Aalst et al. (2005) show that, during the price war, more consumers 
choose which brand to purchase on the basis of prices. As argued in Mela et al. (1997) and 
Nijs et al. (2001) this may again affect the effectiveness of price promotions, if only 
because customers make more explicit price comparisons between different offers. Given 
that the relative price image of brands not directly involved in the price war may have 
deteriorated (as they now have relatively higher prices), while it may be improved for 
brands directly involved, opposite effects can emerge. While the above discussion is not 
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yet exhaustive, it illustrates that there are various arguments to suspect that a price war 
may alter the promotional effectiveness. 
In order to investigate how a price war among retailers changes consumer 
responses to price promotions, we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we identify the 
effects of each sales promotion activity before and during the price war using a multi-break 
event regression (e.g. Ben-David and Papell 2000). In the second step, we identify the 
drivers of promotion effectiveness by regressing the parameters obtained from the previous 
step against promotion-, product- and retailer characteristics, in a "business-as-usual” 
scenario versus, respectively, an indirect price-war and a direct price-war scenario. 
We have detailed information on the promotional activities of 22 products in eight 
categories, between 2001 and 2005, across four leading Dutch national supermarket 
chains. Given that our dataset covers 147 weeks before the price war, and 114 weeks 
during the price war, we can investigate whether promotions’ effectiveness has changed 
because of the price war, while we can also identify the different impact of an indirect 
versus direct price war. 
Chapter 4. Plenty of research decomposed the promotional sales bump into cross-
brand, cross-period, and category-expansion effects (see e.g. Bell et al. 1999, van Heerde 
et al. 2004). However, sales promotions can transfer the demand not only across brands, 
period and categories, but also across competing chains (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). These 
demand shifts across retailers may reduce the overall effect of manufacturers’ sales 
promotions. Yet, there is little empirical knowledge neither about the relative frequency 
and size of these cross-chain effects, nor about the impact of this phenomenon on the 
overall effectiveness of sales promotions for manufacturers. Therefore, the question 
becomes to what extent we can directly model and quantify the impact of cross-chain 
effects. In particular, we are interested in measuring: (1) How often do these cross-effects 
occur? (2) What is the effect size?, and (3) To what extent is the effect symmetric across 
stores? 
The answers to these questions may be of interest to both retailers and the 
manufacturers. For retailers, it is relevant to get a better understanding of the competition, 
and to see clearly (i) who is “stealing” traffic, (ii) based on which type of promotions. For 
manufacturers, it may be even more important, as they need to have an unbiased picture of 
the true effectiveness of their promotion events. Indeed, their promotional sales may 
increase within the focal retailer, while cannibalizing non-promotional sales at competing 
chains. 
Chapter 1  
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Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, we conclude with a brief overview of the key take-away 
of the previous chapters, focusing on their conclusions and their managerial implications. 
We then provide a number of recommendations for further research. 
Figure 1.1. Thesis outline 
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CHAPTER 2: NOT ALL PROMOTIONS ARE MADE EQUAL 
2.1. Introduction 
Every year, billions of euros and dollars are spent on price promotions. In 2005, 
US manufacturers and retailers spent $486 bn on sales promotions, corresponding to 4.5% 
of the US Gross Domestic Product (Promotion Marketing Association 2005). As such, it is 
not surprising that considerable attention has been devoted to studying the performance 
implications of price promotions (for a recent review, see van Heerde and Neslin 2008). 
Our study differs from this prior research along three key dimensions. 
First, previous studies have typically dealt with the average effects of price 
promotions, either at the brand (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2000) or the primary-demand (e.g. 
Nijs et al. 2001) level. This implies that all promotions of the brand (or even all 
promotions occurring within a given category) are assumed to be equally effective. 
Therefore, it is harder (if not impossible) to obtain detailed insights into differences in the 
individual effectiveness across different promotion implementations and contexts. Still, 
managers are well aware of the fact that some of their promotions work better than others. 
In this chapter, we introduce a new methodological approach that allows us to 
identify the effect of individual promotion events. In so doing, we follow the lead of 
Ailawadi et al. (2006), who quantified the effectiveness of individual promotions at the 
CVS drugstore chain in the United States. However, their approach required very detailed 
information, not only from point-of-sales scanner data, but also extensive internal 
company data (such as, for example, the panel data on CVS’s ExtraCare Loyalty Program), 
information that is often proprietary. Our approach, in contrast, uses conventional scanner 
data, which is more commonly available. 
Second, as we are now able to pinpoint the effect of each individual promotion 
event, we can identify the drivers of promotional effectiveness in a much more detailed 
way, focusing on how the promotion is planned (timing, discount, duration), framed to the 
consumer (price cuts versus quantity discounts and/or involving other types of promotions 
like loyalty programs), and supported (with in-store and/or out-of-store communication). 
Third, one domain where we show that an individual promotion analysis is 
particularly important is that of the promotional calendar. While studying the promotional 
calendar, researchers have often investigated the frequency of sales promotions (e.g. 
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Blattberg et al. 1995, Silva-Risso et al. 1999). However, two brands with the same 
“aggregate” frequency may still have a very different promotional schedule. For example, 
both brands in Figure 1 have four promotions in the considered time span. While they are 
uniformly spread for brand A, they are clustered in a limited time span for brand B (Figure 
2.1), which may affect the effectiveness of a promotion at a given point (Xo). Although the 
average frequency of sales promotions is the same for brand A and brand B, in the case of 
brand B there is a large variation in the “time elapsed since the previous promotion”. For 
brand A, instead, this variable is constant.  
Figure 2.1. Same frequency, different timing (X = promotion event) 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, prior research has focused almost exclusively on the frequency of the 
promotions within a given retailer. This was mainly due to the data available, often 
collected only at a single chain rather than across different chains (e.g. CVS for Ailawadi 
et al. 2006, Dominick’s Finer Foods for Srinivasan et al. 2004). Instead, we also consider 
the timing of promotions for the same brand with competing retailers, and show that this 
has an impact on the effectiveness of a new promotional event. As such, when planning 
their promotional activities, managers should take into account the promotional calendar 
not only with the focal chain, but also with competing chains. 
 
Example  
Brand A:      X                       X                            X                           X                      Xo 
              time 
 
Example  
Brand B:                                 X       X       X       X      Xo 
              time 
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2.2. Literature review 
2.2.1. Individual versus average effects 
The extant literature tends to estimate the average sales response to price 
promotions (e.g. Nijs et al. 2001, Steenkamp et al. 2005). This way, one cannot determine 
which promotion event was most successful, and why. Some attempts to capture cross-
promotion variation have been made through the incorporation of moderating effects for 
folder and display communication (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2004) or through the use of 
varying parameter models (e.g. Foekens et al. 1999). As such, van Heerde et al. (2004) 
computed separate “average” effects for pure price cuts and price cuts supported by folder, 
display or folder and display, while Foekens et al. (1999) allowed the average promotional 
effectiveness to vary with the time and amount of previous promotions. On the one hand, 
these prior studies clearly indicate that promotional effectiveness (even for the same brand) 
is not constant across implementations. On the other hand, the number of interaction terms 
considered remained fairly limited. 
The need to look at the effectiveness of individual promotions was recently 
emphasized by Ailawadi et al. (2006, 2007). Their research uses a cross-sectional method, 
based on internal company data, to compute how many incremental units each promotion 
was able to lift from the baseline sales. They find that promotions generate an average 
gross lift of 310% (SD = 581%) and that only 45% of this lift is truly incremental (after 
controlling for cross-period, cross-store1 and cross-brand effects). Moreover, not all 
promotions were found to be effective. When profits were considered, in 17% of the cases 
in their dataset, the promotional margin was even negative. In the study of Ailawadi et al., 
very detailed company data were available/needed, which limits the general applicability 
of the method. In contrast, we propose a method to estimate econometrically the 
effectiveness of individual promotions from longitudinal data, using commonly available 
retail scanner data. To that extent, we use recently developed structural-break time-series 
techniques, which extend the intervention approach advocated by Leone (1987) to a setting 
where multiple promotions take place in the considered time span. In so doing, we 
explicitly account for deceleration and stockpiling effects, and control for a variety of other 
                                                        
 
1 In this context, the term “store” refers to another store of the same chain, CVS. 
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factors that may affect a brand’s baseline sales, such as advertising campaigns and 
competitive actions. 
2.2.2. Drivers of promotional effectiveness 
Prior research has investigated variations in promotional effectiveness mainly 
across brands and product categories. For example, Srinivasan et al. (2004) linked 
promotional effectiveness to brand characteristics (market share, private label vs. national 
brand, promotional frequency and depth)2 and category characteristics (market 
concentration, SKU proliferation, private-label share, ability to stockpile, impulse 
category). Such brand and category characteristics are of high strategic relevance to the 
retailers, as they are primarily interested in understanding which brand and/or category is 
most sensitive to the promotion. However, also within the same store and for the same 
brand, there is quite some variation across promotional activities, as promotion events can 
be planned, framed and supported differently. From a manufacturer’s point of view, 
contextual characteristics, such as brand and/or category characteristics, can hardly be 
varied. Deal execution characteristics (deal planning, framing and support), in contrast, 
can be managed more easily and more directly. 
Deal planning. When talking about deal planning, we refer to (1) the timing of 
the promotions (relative to previous promotions), (2) the depth of the promotions, and (3) 
the duration of the promotion event. So far, to capture deal planning, scholars have mainly 
used the aggregate frequency of sales promotions, instead of the time elapsed since the 
previous promotion event (Bell et al. 1999). They find conflicting evidence. While some of 
these studies find that fewer deals increase the saliency of price promotions, leading to 
more attractive deals (Bell et al. 1999, Raju 1992), others show that more frequent 
promotions are more effective (Neslin 2002). Moreover, prior research indicates that a 
higher discount level may improve consumers’ evaluation of the deal and trigger more 
purchases (Krishna 1991). A longer duration, in turn, may give consumers more 
opportunities to take advantage of the deal (Cooper et al. 1999), and to build more 
inventory at the promotion price, inducing greater post-promotion dips. 
                                                        
 
2 In this prior research, promotional frequency and depth were operationalized as brand characteristics. They 
captured variations across brands, and identified to what extent a given brand relied more or less on sales 
promotions to stimulate sales. In our study, in contrast, we will operationalize promotional frequency and depth at 
the individual promotion level. We will categorize them among promotional planning characteristics, as they 
explain variation across promotions and their individual implementation.  
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Deal framing. Consumers’ reactions to promotions may also be contingent on the 
way promotions are framed (Darke and Chung 2005, Krishna et al. 2002). As such, 
different reactions may be obtained depending on whether the discount is framed as a pure 
price cut, as a quantity discount (Macé and Neslin 2004, Wansink et al. 1998), as part of a 
loyalty program (Kivetz and Simonson 2002, Zhang and Wedel 2009) or as a non-
monetary promotion (Chandon et al. 2000). For example, quantity discounts, loyalty 
programs and non-monetary promotions are often less effective than pure price cuts. 
However, as Chandon et al. (2000) point out, that may depend on the context, and in 
particular, on the product category. 
Deal support. Promotional events can be supported by various forms of out-of-
store communication. For example, retailers often employ features to communicate their 
promotional messages to potential customers, and to increase both store traffic and the 
sales of the promoted items (e.g. Bawa and Shoemaker 1987, Walters and MacKenzie 
1988). Prior research has shown that folders are able to boost the sales lift within the focal 
retailer. Moreover, advertising support at the time of the promotion may lead to positive or 
negative synergies (Kaul and Wittink 1995, Mitra and Lynch 1995). For example, non-
price advertisements that differentiate the brand’s image decrease price sensitivity, while 
price advertisements increase price and discount sensitivity. 
Previous literature has also shown that the market share of the brand (e.g. Bolton 
1989), the concentration level in the category (e.g. Pauwels et al. 2007) and the inventory 
turnover,3 which is closely related to the purchase frequency of a brand (e.g. Bell et al. 
1999), can also influence the effectiveness of promotional activities. For example, brands 
with a higher market share (Bolton 1989), in less concentrated categories (Ailawadi et al. 
2006), and with a higher purchase frequency (Bell et al. 1999) tend to have a lower 
promotional effectiveness than brands with a lower market share, in more concentrated 
categories, or with a lower purchase frequency. 
2.3. Model 
To investigate the effectiveness of individual price promotion events, we adopt a 
two-step approach. In a first step, we determine the total sales effectiveness of each 
individual promotion using a time-series structural-break model, developed by Ben-David 
                                                        
 
3 Inventory turnover indicates how many times the brand’s inventory is sold and replaced over a period. 
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and Papell (2000). This extends the intervention approach of Leone (1987) to a setting 
involving multiple promotions. The occurrence of each price promotion is captured 
through a separate pulse dummy, which equals one in the week(s) of the promotion event 
and zero otherwise. This practice is conceptually very different from what is typically 
performed in the SCAN*PRO tradition (see e.g. van Heerde et al. 2008 for a review) 
where price promotions are captured by a single price index, defined as the ratio between 
the shelf price and the regular non-promoted price. However, as we mentioned before, this 
leads to the estimate of an average effect across all the promotion events implemented by 
that brand.  
In the case of P promotions, we include a set of P pulse dummy variables 
PROMOi,c,j,p,t , which equal 1 in the week(s) t of promotion event p of product i (of 
category c) at retailer j and 0 otherwise. We account for possible post-promotion dips by 
adding lags of these dummy variables. For parsimony reasons, we consider two lags.4 
 
(E1)       , 
 
where i indicates the product (i = 1,..., I), c represents the category (c = 1,..., C), j the chain 
(j = 1,..., J), and t the week (t = 1,..., T). SALESi,c,j,t refers to the sales in volume, while 
βi,c,j,p,l expresses the parameter for the impact of individual promotion event p (p = 1 ,..., P) 
in week t - l (l = 0, 1, 2) of product i of category c at retailer j. 
The total effect (TE) of a given promotional event is then given by: 
 
(E2)        , 
 
for which the standard errors can be derived through the Delta method (Greene 2003).  
The model in Equation E1 is augmented in four ways to avoid confounding 
effects due to missing variables. First, to filter out the average effect of competitive 
promotions by the same brand at a competing retailer (CPi,c,j’,t) (j’ ≠ j), three dummy 
variables are added to the model to capture, respectively, the instantaneous average effect 
and the two lagged effects of these events. To save degrees of freedom, we control for the 
average effect of these confounding events, rather than for their individual (promotion- and 
                                                        
 
4  We also considered the possibility of adding a third lag or one or more lead terms (to capture pre-promotional 
dips). However, the two-lag specification was preferred (based on the AIC fit criterion) for close to 95% of the 
brands. 
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retail-specific) effects. Second, we control for the dynamic impact of brand advertising by 
adding the advertising goodwill of the focal brand (ADSTOCKi,c,t) (Jedidi et al. 1999). The 
latter is operationalized using the conventional Adstock specification, in which we allow 
the decay parameter to be product-specific (we elaborate on this issue in the Data section). 
To capture the evolution of sales over time, a trend variable is included in the model 
(TRENDt). Finally, two trigonometric terms, sin (2πt/52) and cos (2πt/52), are added to 
account in a parsimonious way for seasonal fluctuations in the series (Hanssens et al. 
2001: 46). 
The final model is given in the equation below. 
 
(E3)  
 
 
 
 
 
We estimate this equation for a given product i across all the retailers 
simultaneously. To allow for autocorrelation in the error terms, and to exploit cross-
equation correlations, we adopt an iterative SUR-GLS procedure with Prais–Winsten 
correction, as in van Heerde et al. (2004), to obtain more efficient parameter estimates 
(Judge et al. 1985). The error is therefore distributed as: 
 
εi,c,j,t = ρi,c,j εi,c,j,t-1 + υi,c,j,t 
εi,c,j’,t =ρi,c,j’ εi,c,j’,t-1 + υi,c,j’,t 
cov [υi,c,j,t , υi,c,j’,t] = σi,c,j,j’  
 
where υi,c,j,t ~ ),0( 2 ,, jciN υσ , and υi,c,j’,t ~ ),0( 2 ',, jciN υσ .  
We then normalize the total effects of each promotion event by dividing them by 
the baseline sales (the baseline sales are measured as the average non-promotional sales of  
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each brand within the focal retailer).5 
 
(E4)  TE*i,c,j,p =        i,c,j,p,l /BASELINE_SALESi,c,j  
 
 In a second step, we relate the normalized total effect of each promotion event p 
(from E4) to different promotional and contextual characteristics. To correct for a potential 
violation of the statistical independence assumption induced by the fact that several 
promotions were organized for the same brand, a random-effect correction at the brand 
level is used to allow within-brand correlation.6 
 
(E5) TE*i,c,j,p = μ +     μj’ DRj +     μc’’ DCc +  
β1 Log TIMINGi,c,j,p + β2 Log TIMING_COMPi,c,j,p +  
β3 SIMULTANEOUS i,c,j,p + β4 Log DEPTHi,c,j,p + 
β5 Log DURATIONi,c,j,p + β6 QUANTITYi,c,j,p + 
β7 LOYALTYi,c,j,p + β8 OTHERi,c,j,p + β9 FEATUREi,c,j,p + 
β10 DISPLAYi,c,j,p + β11 Log ADSTOCKi,c,p +     
β12 Log MKTSHAREi,c,j+ β13 Log CONCENTRATIONi,c,j+ 
β14 Log INVENTORYi,c + ui  + νi,c,j,p 
 
where TE*i,c,j,p is the normalized total promotional effect, μ1  is the intercept, and DRj and 
DCc are, respectively, retailer- and category-specific dummy variables. TIMING refers to 
the time elapsed since the previous promotion for the same brand implemented at, 
respectively, the same retailer (TIMINGi,c,j,p) and at a competing retailer 
(TIMING_COMPi,c,j,p). SIMULTANEOUSi,c,j,p is a dummy variable capturing the effect of a 
concurrent promotion of the same brand at a competing retailer j’ (with j’ ≠ j). DEPTHi,c,j,p 
                                                        
 
5 In the computation of the average non-promotional sales, we do not include the promotional week, or the two 
weeks after the promotion event, in order to filter out any (post-) promotional effects from the baseline sales. 
Also, we checked if the sales series was trending. 
6 One could use a one-stage approach instead of our two-stage approach. However, as shown by Bolton (1989: 
159), as we have a large number of independent variables and brands, a one-stage approach becomes 
prohibitively complex. Moreover, we avoid possible bias in the standard errors of the second stage by weighting 
the estimated dependent variable TE* by the inverse of its standard error (see Narasimhan et al. 1996, Nijs et al. 
2001, Steenkamp et al. 2005 for a similar approach). 
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and DURATIONi,c,j,p refer to the depth of the discount and the duration of the promotional 
event, respectively. QUANTITYi,c,j,p and LOYALTYi,c,j,p are dummy variables indicating, 
respectively, whether the promotion was framed as a quantity discount or tied to the 
retailer’s loyalty program. OTHERi,c,j,p captures non-monetary promotions, like free gifts, 
and is also a dummy variable. FEATUREi,c,j,p is a dummy variable indicating whether a 
feature communication supported the promotion event, while DISPLAYi,c,j,p is a dummy 
variable capturing the presence of an in-store display. ADSTOCKi,c,p represents the 
cumulative stock of past and current advertising expenditure at the time of promotion p.  
To have more reliable estimates of the effects of the focal constructs, we also 
include the following control variables: the market share of the brand (MKTSHAREi,c,j), the 
concentration level within the category (CONCENTRATIONi,c,j) and the inventory turnover 
of the brand (INVENTORYi,c).7  To reduce the skewness of the data, a natural log 
transformation is applied to the continuous variables described above (e.g. Ruppert and 
Aldershof 1989). ui is the random effect of the ith brand, distributed with an expected 
value of 0 and variance σu². The error term vi,c,j,p is normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance σv².  
2.4. Data 
2.4.1. Sample composition  
The dataset covers a time span of 147 weeks, from January 2001 to mid October 
2003. During these 3 years, we analyze a total of 519 promotional events. They represent 
all the national promotions8 for the 30 brands in the assortment of a leading multinational 
CPG manufacturer. The 30 brands belong to 8 different product categories, ranging from 
bread replacements to biscuits and snacks. The fact that these products are indulgence 
goods may have implications for our results, as “a sales promotion’s effectiveness is 
determined by the utilitarian or hedonic nature of the benefits it delivers and the 
congruence these benefits have with the promoted product” (Chandon et al. 2000: 65). For 
                                                        
 
7 MKTSHARE and CONCENTRATION vary over the years, depending on the timing of the promotional event. 
For reasons of simplicity, we do not include the year subscript. INVENTORY, instead, varies only across brands. 
This variable was not available at a more refined level.  
8 For “national promotions”, we refer to promotions implemented at the national level, with a distribution 
coverage of no less than 80%. 
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example, non-monetary promotions (e.g. loyalty programs, free gifts) may work better for 
indulgence goods than pure price cuts, in contrast to more utilitarian products, like toilet 
paper or coffee, where pure price cuts outperform non-monetary promotions. 
A first visual inspection of the data suggests a large variability in the effectiveness 
across promotion events of the same brand, even within the same retailer. Figure 2.2, for 
example, illustrates the sales of one of the brands in our sample over time. The different 
impacts of six promotion events of this brand (indicated by a vertical arrow) are evident 
from Figure 2.2. Some promotions generate only a modest sales lift (e.g. in weeks 11 and 
51), while others appear to boost sales to a much greater extent (e.g. in weeks 73, 80, 125 
and 129). 
These promotions, however, were implemented in different ways: the first 
promotion (in week 11) had a 22% discount, lasted for two weeks, and was not supported 
by a folder or display; the last promotion (in week 129), in contrast, had a 30% discount, 
lasted for one week and was supported by both folder and display. On average, promotions 
for this brand seem to be quite effective. 
However, as shown by the graph, some are considerably more effective than 
others. 
Figure 2.2. Variation in promotion effectiveness within product. 
Sales (in volume) over time (Product 13, Retailer 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Not all promotions are made equal 
17 
Figure 2.3. Perceptual map of the relative position of the retailers (source: GfK 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data are collected in the Netherlands at four leading national supermarket 
chains9 (these chains were also the key ones considered by van Heerde et al. 2008; while 
Retailer 1 was studied as well by Ailawadi et al. 2008). Together, these chains cover 70% 
of the Dutch FMCG market (Planet Retail 2006). They vary in terms of pricing, market 
share, service level and extent of promotional activities (see Figure 2.3 and Table 2.1) 
(GfK Report 2002). 
Promotion and sales data were collected through ACNielsen, and augmented with 
internal company data on the way each promotion was framed to the consumer (for the 
second step). Finally, weekly advertising expenses for the brands in our dataset were 
obtained from Nielsen Media Research.  
All the data used in the first step are commonly available, i.e. no proprietary 
company data are needed, which distinguishes our implementation from the approach of 
Ailawadi et al. (2006, 2007). 
                                                        
 
9 With 4 retailers and 8 product categories, there are 27 independent variables for our second step. 
■    Retailer 4 
Inexpensive 
Expensive 
■    Retailer 1 
■    Retailer 2 
■    Retailer 3 
High service Low service 
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2.4.2. Measures  
Deal planning. The TIMING since the previous promotion event was 
operationalized in terms of the number of weeks elapsed since the last promotion. We 
distinguish two timing variables, capturing the time elapsed since the previous promotion 
for the same brand implemented at, respectively, the same retailer (TIMINGi,c,j,p, M = 5.07, 
SD = 13.46) and at a competing retailer (TIMING_COMPi,c,j,p, M = 6.83, SD = 10.16) (see 
Table 2.1). The potential confounding effect generated by a SIMULTANEOUS promotion 
is measured by a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there is a concurrent 
promotion event of the same brand at a competing retailer. This was the case in 68.6% of 
all instances. Deal DEPTH is defined as the percentage of the promotional discount (e.g. 
Nijs et al. 2001) (M = 21.43, SD = 12.15), while DURATION is operationalized as the 
number of promotional weeks (e.g. Cooper et al. 1999) (M = 1.27, SD = .65). 
Deal framing. The framing of the promotion is operationalized by means of three 
dummy variables, (1) indicating the presence of a quantity discount involving the purchase 
of multiple packs of the product (e.g. “buy one, get one for free”-type of offer) 
(QUANTITY) (frequency = 14.2%), (2) a loyalty program of the retailer (e.g. when a 
discount is offered only to holders of the retailer’s loyalty card) (LOYALTY) (frequency = 
12.4%), or (3) a non-monetary promotion (e.g. when a gift is included in the package, like 
a small toy/game for kids) (OTHER) (frequency = 3.3%). As OTHER represents non-
monetary promotions, DEPTH = 0, when OTHERS = 1. The reference group consists of 
pure price cuts. 
Deal communication. Out-of-store communication is measured by a dummy 
variable, indicating whether the promotion is supported by feature communication 
(FEATURE) (frequency = 42.2%), while in-store communication is captured by a dummy 
variable indicating whether the promotion is supported by an in-store display (DISPLAY) 
(frequency = 4.7%). To quantify contemporaneous and delayed brand advertising effects, 
we use the log of the Adstock specification of the advertising expenditure of the brand, 
defined through the weighted average of past advertising expenditure, e.g. log 
(ADSTOCKi,c,t) = log (         Adv i,c,t-w) (Jedidi et al. 1999), where the weight pattern evolves 
over time according to decay parameter λi. We use a fixed number of six lags, based on the 
average duration of six weeks identified by previous studies using weekly data (Leone 
∑
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1995: G143). The decay parameter λi is estimated by means of a grid search procedure10 
for each product i conducted by running the model in E3 for each set of λs (for λ = .01 to 
.99, in steps of .01). We chose the model with the λ that minimizes the AIC criterion. The 
average λ for the advertising expenditure of the brand is .56 (SD = .19), which is in line 
with the average decay parameter reported by Leone (1995: G144; λ = .54). For the second 
step, we use the value of this Adstock variable at the time of the promotion p¸ 
ADSTOCKi,c,p (M = 62,475, SD = 14,1914). This huge variability is due to the fact that the 
manufacturer did not invest in advertising for 37% of its brands. In those cases, this 
variable is equal to 0. Therefore, before taking the log, we add one to every observation of 
the Adstock variable. 
Control variables. MKTSHARE is defined as the yearly sales (in volume) of brand 
i at the focal retailer j in the focal year, divided by the sales (in volume) of all the brands in 
the category at retailer j (M = 6.06, SD = 4.95). CONCENTRATION refers to the sum of 
the yearly market shares of the top three brands in the category at the focal retailer, as in 
previous work in industrial organization (Bowman and Gatignon 1995) and marketing 
(Pauwels et al. 2007)  (M = 23.68, SD = 9.22). INVENTORY is a ratio that indicates how 
many times the brand’s inventory is sold and replaced over a period (Bell et al. 1999) (M = 
9.51, SD = 6.15). This variable is the inverse of a commonly-used metric for inter-purchase 
time.11  
To capture variation across the four retailers, we set Retailer 1 as the reference, 
and include in the model three dummy variables assuming the value of one for, 
respectively, Retailer 2, Retailer 3 and Retailer 4. Similarly, we use seven dummy 
variables to capture variation across the eight product categories in our sample. 
All the marketing variables are available on a weekly basis and, unlike previous 
research, are specific to each individual promotion event, rather than averages computed 
over time and/or promotional events. In fact, we use averages only for the control 
variables.  
                                                        
 
10 The decay parameter (for a given brand) is assumed to be the same for every retailer. We assume that there is 
no variation across retailers. Nevertheless, we conducted a robustness check and we found little variation across 
retailers. Moreover, allowing the decay parameter to vary across products and retailers does not impact on the 
final results.  
11 Given the differences among the retailers, certain brands may be more popular within a specific chain and less 
in a competing one, as the customers (their preferences and purchases) may differ across stores. For this reason, 
MKTSHARE and CONCENTRATION are retailer-specific. The variable INVENTORY was provided by 
ACNielsen, and was not available at the retailer level. 
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Table 2.1 summarizes the relevant descriptive statistics. It is worth noticing that 
there are significant differences across retailers. For example, overall, Retailer 3 
implemented the smallest number of promotions (96), although in 38% of the cases, we 
find more promotions implemented at Retailer 3 than at Retailer 1 (suggesting more 
concentration of promotional support in a few categories). The promotions implemented at 
Retailer 4 and Retailer 2 are facing competition from a simultaneous promotion event 
offered at a competing retailer in 60% of the cases, in comparison with almost 80% of the 
cases for promotions implemented at Retailer 1 and Retailer 3. Also, there is great 
variation in the average discount depth offered: while Retailer 4 offers an average discount 
of 27%, at Retailer 3 (relatively less expensive and more service-oriented than Retailer 4, 
see Figure 2.3) the average discount depth is only 17%. Also features, another important 
driver of promotional effectiveness together with the depth of the discount (Blattberg et al. 
1995), is differently implemented across retailers. At Retailer 3 only 5% of the promotions 
are supported by features, while Retailer 4 uses feature communication for 76% of its 
promotions. Instead, Retailer 1 uses more display communication than the other retailers, 
i.e. 11%. Displays are in fact implemented at Retailer 2 and Retailer 4 in only 1% of the 
cases, and in 4% of the cases at Retailer 3. We refer to Table 2.1 for more details.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
12 For comparison purposes, we report some descriptive statistics of one of the most recent studies using data 
from the Dutch grocery stores, i.e. the work of Van Heerde et al. (2004) on peanut butter and shampoo. In their 
sample, promotions were implemented with an average discount of 17% (with a minimum discount of 6%), were 
supported by feature in 20% of the cases (with a minimum frequency of 12%), and by display in 18% of the cases 
(with a minimum frequency of 5%).  
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics (M = mean, SD = standard deviation) 
 
 Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 Overall 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
PLANNING           
TIMING (weeks) 5.80 14.53 3. 36 8.46 7.22 19.58 4.02 9.98 5.07 13.46 
TIMING_COMP (weeks) 6.41 6.74 6.33 12.63 6.40 11.98 8.14 9.21 6.83 10.16 
SIMULTANEOUS 
(frequency %)* 76.62  61.07  76.47  61.54  68.55  
DEPTH (%) 21.73 8.36 20.11 10.20 16.95 11.14 27.45 12.37 21.43 12.15 
DURATION (weeks) 1.32 .52 1.34 .66 1.15 .61 1.23 .97 1.27 .65 
FRAMING (vs. pure price 
cut) 
          
QUANTITY (frequency 
%)* 23.38  9.32  13.86  8.39  14.19  
LOYALTY (frequency 
%)* 16.20  15.61  5.94  9.52  12.39  
OTHER (frequency %)* 2.35  1.76  1.98  6.92  3.34  
COMMUNICATION (vs. 
in-store shelf tag)           
FEATURE (frequency %)* 44.08  33.59  4.95  75.91  42.23  
DISPLAY (frequency %)* 11.18  1.36  3.96  .73  4.66  
ADSTOCK (in 1,000 euro) 52.83 111. 39 8.23 20.37 7.34 141.91 47.36 96.64 62.48 14.19 
CONTROL VARIABLES        4.51   
MKTSHARE (%) 5.65 4.79 6.19 5.05 6.84 5.58 5.88 9.34 6.06 4.95 
CONCENTRATION (C3 
%) 24.17 8.69 24.02 9.33 24.32 9.65 22.34 6.71 23.68 9.22 
INVENTORY 9.27 6.14 9.74 6.32 9.06 5.12 9.88  9.51 6.15 
SAMPLE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
          
Total number of 
promotions 158  128  96  137  519  
Promotion per product and 
retailer 5.58 2.73 4.1 3.6 3.62 2.56 4.93 3.01 4.84 2.89 
*For the dummy variables, we report the frequency (%). 
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2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Are promotions effective? 
We estimate the model specified in E2 for each product across all the retailers 
simultaneously, using iterative SUR-GLS with Prais–Winsten correction. The average R2 
across all the models (Judge et al. 1985, van Heerde et al. 2004) is .93. For each product–
retailer combination, we compute the normalized total effect of every promotion event 
(TE*), as described in E4. The respective standard errors are derived using the Delta 
method.  
We find that TE* is significant (one-sided p-value <.05) and positive in 84% of 
the cases, indicating that the vast majority of the sales promotions were able to 
significantly increase sales (Table 2.2). This effect already incorporates dynamic effects 
like post-promotion dips (see E2).  
Overall, these average results appear to be in line with the results reported by 
Srinivasan et al. (2004: 622) of 84% significant promotions.13 Although the overall picture 
is very positive, we notice quite some variability across retailers (Table 2.2). Whereas we 
find that up to 89% of all the promotions were effective at Retailer 2, at Retailer 4 only 
77% of all the actions had a positive impact. The proportion test (Sheskin 2000) reveals 
that the percentage of effective promotions at Retailer 3 is significantly smaller than at 
Retailer 1 (two-proportion z-test = 1.67, p < .10) or at Retailer 2 (two-proportion z-test = 
2.24, p < .05). 
Even more variability exists across products. Figure 2.4 shows that, while all the 
promotional activities of some products systematically increase sales (in 100% of the cases 
for products 14, 19, 21, 27 and 30), for other products (e.g. products 7, 28 and 29) less than 
40% of the promotions are able to lift sales significantly. 
 
 
                                                        
 
13 However, in Srinivasan et al. (2004), the unit of the analysis was not the effect of individual promotions, but the 
average effect of all the promotions for a given brand. That average effect was significant for 84% of all 63 
brands considered.  
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Table 2.2. Percentage of significant promotion events (one-sided p-value < .05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Percentage of effective promotion events (t-value < 1.64) across products 
 
The average (normalized) effect across all products and retailers is 5.9, suggesting 
that after accounting for stockpiling effects a promotion is able to lift sales by a factor of 6. 
This is in line with prior literature. For example, Narasimhan et al. (1996: 24) find that a 
promotion with a 20% discount may increase sales by, on average, a factor 8 (15 for 
displayed price cuts, 8 for featured price cuts and 2 for pure price cuts). 
This effect varies substantially across products. More interestingly, our results 
also show great variation within products and retailers (see Figure 2.5 for details). For 
example, for product 5 at Retailer 3, the normalized effect varies across promotions from a 
maximum of 2.10 (p < .001) to a minimum of -.82 (n.s.), leading to a high coefficient of 
 Positive effects 
Total 84% 
Retailer 1 86% 
Retailer 2 89% 
Retailer 3 77% 
Retailer 4 84% 
N (only positive effects)                         
Total N = 519 
436 
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variation (defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) of 4.89. Similarly, for 
product 8 at Retailer 3, the normalized effect fluctuates from a maximum of 4.64 (p < 
.001) to a minimum of -.37 (n.s.), with a coefficient of variation of 1.25. 
Figure 2.5. Coefficient of variation of promotional effectiveness 
 
2.5.1.1. Model comparison 
We compared our results with those of a log-log model, where we define the 
promotion events by means of the log of the price index, in line with the SCAN*PRO 
model tradition (see e.g. van Heerde and Neslin 2008, Wittink et al. 1988), as well as with 
the results of a linear model, similar to Srinivasan et al. (2004). The main difference 
between the log-log model and our model is that, in the log-log model, we used the log of 
the sales as our dependent variable and the log of the price index (shelf price divided by 
regular non-promotional price) as our key independent variable, instead of the individual 
promotional indicator variables. In the linear model, we replaced the promotional indicator 
variables with the price index. Also, to allow a fair comparison, we re-estimated the 
ADSTOCK variable for each model separately, following the procedure explained above. 
Both models are estimated by iterative SUR-GLS, as we performed with E3.  
The empirical comparisons demonstrate that, based on the AIC criteria, 
accommodating individual promotion heterogeneity does improve the accuracy of the 
promotional parameters relative to the log-log and linear model in 68% of the cases (see 
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Table 2.3). Also, in 96% of the cases our model and the log-log model outperform the 
linear model. Based on this, for simplicity of exposition, we drop the linear model from the 
comparison. 
Table 2.3. Model comparison: lowest AIC 
 
 
The results of the log-log model indicate that the promotions are effective (one-
sided p-value < .05) for 91% of the brands (which account for 94% of the promotions),14 as 
shown in Table 2.4. Table 2.4 indicates that our findings, however, are much richer in the 
sense that they show that, for brands where the log-log model indicated a non-significant 
effect, more than one-third of the promotion events were actually effective (with one of 
them even having a lift of a factor 2.5).15 However, given that several promotions were not 
significant, these not significant effects dominate.16 
Alternatively, for brands for which promotions were significant in the log-log 
model, our approach reveals that as many as 13% of the events were not able to raise sales. 
In fact, Figure 2.4 has already shown that only for 17% of the brands were all the 
promotions significant.17 In all the other cases, at least one of the promotions was not able 
to lift sales significantly. 
                                                        
 
14 This corresponds to a total number of 27 brands with effective promotions. The number of promotions for those 
27 brands is 488, i.e. 94% of the promotions in our sample (see Table 2.4).  
15 To compare the individual effects of each promotion event, obtained from our individual promotion model, 
with the average effects estimated with the log-log model, we transform our results into elasticities. We achieve 
this by normalizing the incremental sales lift obtained in our model by the ratio of the sample mean of the brand’s 
weekly non-promotional sales to the sample mean of the brand’s weekly non-promotional price. Note that an 
increase of 250% is similar in magnitude to the results reported by previous research (see for example Ailawadi et 
al. 2006). 
16 See products 7, 28 and 29 in Figure 2.4.  
17 Figure 2.4 shows that all the promotions of product 10, 14, 19, 21, 27 and 30 were effective.  
 
Individual promotion model Average promotion model 
Our model Log-log model Linear model 
Lowest AIC 68% 29% 3% 
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Table 2.4. Missed opportunities and spoiled arms 
 Log-log model 
  Significant brands (%) Not significant brands (%) 
  27 (91%) 3 (9%) 
In
di
vi
du
al
 p
ro
m
ot
io
n 
m
od
el
  
Number of significant 
promotions (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
424 (87%) 
 
 
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
 
12 (39%) 
 
 
Number of not significant 
promotions (%) 
 
SPOILED ARMS  
 
64 (13%) 
 
 
 
19 (61%) 
Total number of promotions (%) 488 (100%) 31 (100%) 
 
 
To summarize, two types of mistakes can be made:18 
Missed opportunities. When a brand shows overall non-significant promotions, 
managers may infer that all promotions are not effective and therefore may stop promoting 
that brand, missing important opportunities to increase sales. They should instead look at 
the impact of each individual promotion. This way, they would realize that some 
individual promotions might still work.  
Spoiled arms. When a brand shows overall significant promotions, managers may 
infer that all promotions for that brand lift up sales, not realizing that some individual ones 
do not work, and therefore can be considered “spoiled arms” (Leeflang and Wittink 1996, 
Steenkamp et al. 2005). 
                                                        
 
18 The terms “missed opportunities” and “spoiled arms” were previously adopted in the literature by Leeflang and 
Wittink (1996: 106) and Steenkamp et al. (2005: 48).  
Not all promotions are made equal 
27 
2.5.2. Drivers of promotional effectiveness  
To investigate the drivers of those more effective promotions, we relate the 
normalized total effect of each promotion to the way the promotion was implemented (as 
shown in E5). Such knowledge is important, as for 83% of the brands, less than 100% of 
their promotions were effective. Even when they were all effective, we find considerable 
variation among them. If this variation is systematic, managers may exploit it to achieve 
higher overall effectiveness of their promotional events. Table 2.5 shows the estimated 
impact of promotion characteristics and other correlates. Due to space limitation, we do 
not report the category-specific effects (but they are available in Appendix 1).  
The Pseudo R2 is .50. The Chi-square tests (χ212 = 243.8, p < .0001) show that the 
model described in E5 significantly outperforms a model where only retailer and category 
effects are considered. VIF statistics indicate that multicollinearity is not a serious concern 
(VIF < 2). 
Deal planning. Timing. Previous research has worked mainly with the frequency of sales 
promotions. Although frequency and timing are two different constructs, they are highly 
related to each other. Based on these previous studies, we would expect that when more 
time elapses since the previous promotion event (for less frequent promotions) 
implemented at the same retailer, the impact of the focal promotion event may be higher 
(Bell et al. 1999). We would also expect this effect when we consider the timing since the 
previous promotion implemented at a competing retailer, as previous research showed that 
more than 80% of consumers shop for bargains across competing retailers (Fox and Hoch 
2005). This suggests a great amount of cherry-picking and store-switching behavior 
induced by promotion activities (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). Our results confirm both 
assumptions. We find promotions to be more effective when more time elapses between 
two consecutive events, not only when implemented at the same retailer (β1  = .44, p = 
.07), but also at competing retailers (β2 = .51, p = .01 ). Moreover, we also find evidence 
that the simultaneous occurrence of a promotion at a competing retailer (during the same 
week) decreases significantly the effectiveness of the focal promotion event (β3  = -1.26, p 
= .01).19 
 
                                                        
 
19 We also controlled for the timing since the promotion event of competing brands, as well as for the 
simultaneous events of competing brands. Both effects were insignificant (p > .15). 
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Table 2.5. Moderator analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: TE* 
N = 519 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-value Two-sided 
p-value 
 μ1 INTERCEPT 11.831 2.170 .042 
 μ2 DR2 .900 1.440 .152 
 μ3 DR3 -2.443 -3.600 .000 
 μ4 DR4 -1.427 -1.900 .058 
PLANNING       
 β1 Log TIMING .440 1.800 .073 
 β2 Log TIMING_COMP .510 2.480 .014 
 β3 SIMULTANEOUS -1.264 -2.590 .010 
 β4 Log DEPTH .932 1.850 .065 
 β5 Log DURATION -1.770 -3.000 .003 
FRAMING (vs. pure price cut)       
 β6 QUANTITY -.056 -.080 .935 
 β7 LOYALTY -1.653 -1.010 .312 
 β8 OTHER 4.261 1.870 .062 
COMMUNICATION (vs. in-store shelf tag)       
 β9 FEATURE 1.496 2.950 .003 
 β10 DISPLAY 2.365 2.210 .027 
 β11 Log ADSTOCK -.001 -.030 .978 
CONTROL VARIABLE       
 β12 Log MKTSHARE -.900 -2.280 .023 
 β13 Log CONCENTRATION 5.032 2.420 .016 
 β14 Log INVENTORY -1.392 -1.480 .140 
    
N = 519 
Pseudo R2 = .50 
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Depth. Another important driver of price promotion effectiveness is the depth of 
the discount. In line with previous research, we find that higher discounts work better than 
smaller discounts (e.g. Blattberg et al. 1995) (β4  = .93, p = .07). We checked for the 
presence of threshold effects,20 but did not find any evidence to support their presence. 
Duration. Longer promotion events perform worse than shorter ones (β5 = -1.77, p 
< .01). This result differs from that of Cooper et al. (1995). Cooper and colleagues show 
that a longer duration of a promotion generates a higher level of sales, as consumers have 
more opportunities to take advantage of the deal. However, consumers may also be able to 
build more inventory at the promotion price and will induce them to purchase less when 
the price goes up again. The study of Cooper et al. does not account for the negative 
effects induced by these implicit inventory build-ups. One could expect that, when these 
effects are incorporated, longer promotion events may induce a lower level of sales than 
promotion events lasting only one week, as their post-promotion dips can be greater.  
Deal framing. When we look at the way the promotion is framed to the final 
consumers, we compare pure price cuts with other promotional formats like quantity 
discounts, loyalty programs and non-monetary promotions. We find no significant 
difference among pure price cuts, quantity discounts and loyalty programs. The use of a 
non-monetary promotional format (OTHER), however, outperforms pure price cuts (β8 = 
4.26, p =.07). This result is not surprising given the fact that, for indulgence goods like 
those in our sample (hedonic products), non-monetary promotions are found in the 
literature to work better than monetary promotions (Chandon et al. 2000).21 
Deal communication. Out-of-store feature communication (β9 = 1.50, p <.01) as 
well as in-store displays (β10 = 2.37, p < .05) increase sales, confirming the findings of the 
extant literature (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2004). The difference between the effects of 
features and displays is significant (p < .01). Although the majority of previous research 
has shown a higher effectiveness for features than for displays, there are also studies which 
find the opposite effect (e.g. Albuquerque and Bronnenberg 2009, Narasimhan et al. 1996). 
Moreover, we can explain our result based on the nature of our product categories. The 
                                                        
 
20 To check the presence of diminishing returns or threshold effects, we used different specifications. We replaced 
the log of the depth of the discount in E5, log DEPTH, by the depth and its quadratic term, DEPTH and DEPTH2. 
Alternatively, we substituted log DEPTH by three new dummy variables, capturing small, medium, and large 
discounts. In so doing, we used different cut-off values, based on previous literature (e.g. Fok et al. 2007), and 
based on the distribution of our data (i.e. by using as cut-off values the 33rd and the 66th percentile of DEPTH).  
21 We also excluded from the analysis all the non-monetary promotions to limit the investigation to promotions 
for which the consumers could perceive a clear monetary discount (pure price cuts, quantity discounts, loyalty 
programs), and we found no significant change in the results (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).  
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sales promotion response to hedonic products (like the indulgence goods in our sample) 
may differ from product categories like tuna, ketchup or coffee, often studied by previous 
studies. The recent work of Stilley at al. (2009) shows that, for hedonic products, 
purchases are driven more by unplanned in-store decisions. As in-store displays stimulate 
unplanned in-store decisions, it is not surprising to find a higher effectiveness for in-store 
displays than for features.  
The cumulative effects of advertising expenditure do not significantly influence 
price promotion effectiveness (p > .10).  
Control variables. In line with previous research, we find that promotions of 
brands with a high market share are less effective (β12 = -.90, p < .05) (e.g. see Blattberg et 
al. 1995), and that a higher concentration in the product category leads to higher 
effectiveness of sales promotions (β13 = 5.03, p < .05) (e.g. Bell et al. 1999). Also 
consistent with prior literature, we find a negative impact for the inventory turnover, even 
though this effect fails to reach statistical significance (β14 = -1.39, p >.10) (Ailawadi et al. 
2006, Bell et al. 1999). 
2.6. Conclusions 
The extant literature has investigated in detail sales promotion variation across 
products and retailers. Brand managers could therefore infer which brand sells more on 
promotion, and at which retailer. Yet, for a specific brand, they still cannot identify how 
many promotions are truly able to lift up sales, as they cannot pinpoint which ones are 
more effective and which ones are just wasted money. This is the focus of this study.  
Indeed, every promotion stimulates sales in a unique way, as clearly visible when 
we look at the different heights of the deal spikes (Figure 2.2). Nevertheless, research on 
cross-promotion variation is still limited. We propose an “individual promotion” approach 
that allows us to capture in a more flexible way the effectiveness of promotion events and 
their drivers. This way, we obtain a much richer picture of how many promotions are truly 
effective, in comparison with models based on an average promotional parameter. In an 
“average” approach, like a SCAN*PRO model, the researcher computes one average 
parameter across several promotion events. A (not) significant parameter may lead 
managers to (under-) over-estimate the actual number of effective promotions. With our 
approach, we show that such conclusions may be misleading, and result in spoiled arms or 
missed opportunities. For example, while an average approach shows that the promotional 
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activities of a focal brand are not able to stimulate sales, we may find that almost 40% of 
those promotions are actually effective. They would result in a missed opportunity if the 
manufacturers decide to abandon them. In contrast, 13% of the promotion events of brands 
for which the average model indicates a significant promotional effectiveness, are in reality 
spoiled arms, as an individual-promotion analysis indicates that they are not significantly 
able to increase sales. Furthermore, our approach highlights that only for 17% of the 
brands, all promotions are truly able to boost sales. This type of more detailed information 
is not possible with an average model.  
In the second step of the analysis, our approach allows us to use promotion-
specific (dependent and independent) variables, rather than averages computed across 
different promotions. In other words, we can utilize the exact number of weeks between 
two promotion events, the exact discount, etc., and not average frequencies, average 
discounts, etc. This is particularly important when dealing with variables directly 
controlled by manufacturers in the negotiations with retailers. For example, the 
promotional calendar is typically measured at the aggregate brand level (as frequency). 
However, as mentioned above, the same deal frequency can correspond to very different 
promotional calendars (Figure 2.1), with promotions equally spread over time or 
concentrated in a limited time spam. With an average measure it becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, to capture the diverse consequences for the effectiveness of promotional 
activities of distinct promotional calendars. Similarly, the same average discount could 
correspond to different implementations. Three promotions with an average price cut of 
20% could have been implemented with individual discounts of 20% each, or with a 
discount of 5%, 20% and 35%, leading to individual differences in their deal spikes, again 
not fully captured by an average model. Therefore, we highlight the importance of looking 
at a more refined measure, identified at the individual promotion level.  
Moreover, we take into account the promotional calendar of competing chains, 
not considered by previous studies (e.g. Srinivasan et al. 2005). The fact that previous 
studies have long ignored the promotional calendar of competing stores may be due to a 
lack of data of competing chains, as the majority of work in the sales promotion domain 
tends to rely on data of a single retail chain (e.g. CVS for Ailawadi et al. 2006, Dominick’s 
Finer Foods for Srinivasan et al. 2004). An additional reason why this aspect may have 
been ignored so far could be that managers tend to ignore competing promotion events, 
and do not react to them (Steenkamp et al. 2004). We find that this practice may not be 
optimal. In particular, we show that promotion events at a competing retailer (for the same 
product) reduce significantly the effectiveness of sales promotions at the focal chain, not 
Chapter 2  
32 
only when they occur simultaneously (in the same week) but also when little time has 
elapsed between these competing events. Manufacturers, selling through competing 
retailers, should take this into account when planning their sales promotions.  
These results provide some first evidence to support the existence of cross-chain 
effects. In fact, so far limited attempts have been made to capture the impact of cross-chain 
effects. While some studies report no signs of cross-chain effects (Bucklin and Lattin 
1992, Vilcassim and Chintagunta 1992), others show that more than 80% of the 
households cherry-pick (Fox and Hoch 2005), suggesting that cross-chain effects may be 
significant. In this chapter, we capture the existence of cross-chain effects by means of the 
competitive promotional calendar (without explicitly modeling these effects; for a more 
formal approach see Chapter 4). In so doing, we provide some first empirical evidence that 
shows that cross-chain effects may reduce significantly the effectiveness of sales 
promotions, and therefore should no longer be ignored.  
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CHAPTER 3: SALES PROMOTION EFFECTIVENESS DURING A 
PRICE WAR 
3.1. Introduction 
Over the years, price competition has tended to increasingly degenerate into price 
wars (Rao et al. 2000), especially during economic recessions (Green and Porter 1984, 
Staiger and Wolak 1992), or when the industry faces a new entrant (Elzinga and Mills 
1999, Milgrom and Roberts 1982). Despite the growing number of price wars, little 
systematic research has assessed how price wars alter the effectiveness of brand 
manufacturers’ price and promotional strategies. More specifically, while the sales 
implications have been investigated, the impact on promotional sensitivity remains 
unclear. Are temporary price discounts more (or less) effective in a scenario characterized 
by frequent announcements of permanent price cuts on various players in the market? 
Price wars can be initiated by both retailers and manufacturers. While the extant 
literature concentrates on the initiators of the price war and their competitors, we study 
how price wars initiated by retailers impact the sales and price-promotion effectiveness of 
the manufacturers. The latter have to sell and sustain their brands in a price war 
environment. Even though the decrease in the overall price level may have a favorable 
effect on the national brand’s sales, it is unclear how a price war alters the effectiveness of 
the brand manufacturer’s marketing activities. In particular, the impact of one of the 
manufacturer’s main pricing tools, price promotions, may change as retailers decrease 
regular prices. Basically, national brand manufacturers may face one of the two following 
scenarios:  
(1) an indirect price-war scenario: the retailer does not permanently reduce the 
price of the focal brand, but reduces the price of a competing brand in the 
category.22 Given that the focal brand’s price is not reduced, its relative price 
increases.  
                                                        
 
22 In this chapter, when talking about the indirect effects, we focus on a scenario where the prices of competing 
brands are reduced during the price war. One could also identify another type of indirect effect, where the prices 
of other brands in the category are as well not affected. In our dataset, only four promotion events fall in this 
additional scenario. For this reason, this setting is not considered and these four observations are removed from 
the analysis.  
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(2) a direct price-war scenario: the retailer reduces the price of the focal brand, 
and thus involves it directly in the price war. Depending on what happens 
with other brands in the category, the focal brand’s relative price may 
increase or decrease. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates these two scenarios. At time t the price war starts. As long as 
the focal brand is not included in the retailer’s round of regular price reductions, it only 
experiences the price war indirectly. At time t’ the retailer decides to decrease the regular 
price of the focal brand. From that point onwards, the focal brand experiences the price 
war directly. In the second panel of Figure 3.1, some potential implications of the indirect 
and direct price wars for both sales and sales promotions are illustrated. As the effects may 
depend on the relative price of the focal brand, the graph illustrates different scenarios:  
Figure 3.1. Example of the effects of indirect and direct price wars on a focal brand j 
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(1) a decrease in sales, if the relative price deteriorates (solid line), (2) an increase in sales, 
if the relative price improves (dashed line), or (3) no impact, if the relative price does not 
change (dotted line). Similarly, these changes may affect also sales promotion 
effectiveness. As the regular (relative) price changes during price wars, a similar 
percentage price cut may generate a different sales lift (for a closer look at the implications 
of the price war, we refer to paragraph 3.3).  
Based on previous research, it is difficult to assess ex ante the impact of an 
indirect and direct price war on sales and promotional effectiveness. For example, Rao et 
al. (2000) advise managers to avoid price wars, as they will train consumers to focus on 
lower prices exclusively, rather than on other differentiating elements based on quality. As 
such, they believe price wars may degenerate the profitability of the focal company and of 
the entire industry. Although managers recognize the importance of this message, they 
may be afraid that an unfavorable relative price position (in case they do not lower their 
prices) will inevitably lead to lower sales (and therefore a severe loss in terms of market 
share). Still, no study has empirically tested the impact of these two scenarios on sales and 
promotional effectiveness.23 
So far, little systematic research has assessed the marketing consequences of price 
wars. In 2001, after a comprehensive review, Heil and Helsen (2001: 87) pointed out that 
“direct research on price wars in marketing is lacking, as such research is predominantly 
situated in the area of non-cooperative game theory.” This situation has not changed much 
since then. The existing literature has mainly provided a definition of the phenomenon 
(e.g. Heil and Helsen 2001), and insights into the conditions leading to a price war (e.g. 
Griffith and Rust 1997, Heil and Helsen 2001, Leeflang and Wittink 1996, Ramaswamy et 
al. 1994). To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical work on the topic is the recent 
work of van Heerde et al. (2008) on the effects of price wars among grocery retailers on 
two major components of retailer performance, store choice and spending per shopper (for 
more details, see paragraph 3.2). They find that, during a price war, as price sensitivity 
increases, consumers tend to base their store choice on the overall price image of the store. 
These insights raise further questions regarding the impact of the price war on the 
effectiveness of manufacturers’ pricing and promotional policies. For example, since a 
price war trains consumers to decide where to shop based on price (van Heerde et al. 
                                                        
 
23 The work of van Heerde et al. (2008) has empirically tested the impact of a price war on regular sales. In so 
doing, the authors did not distinguish between an indirect price-war phase and a direct price-war phase.  
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2008), will it also make consumers more sensitive to price promotions once inside the 
store? Will consumers pay disproportional attention to the promotions of products whose 
price are reduced during the price war? 
In this paper, we address these questions by investigating the Dutch price war that 
started in October 2003 among Dutch grocery retailers. We intend to contribute to previous 
literature along four dimensions. First, we build on the research developed by van Heerde 
et al. (2008) on the marketing consequences of price wars by investigating the 
effectiveness of sales promotions during price wars. While van Heerde et al. (2008) study 
the effects of the price war on store choice and basket size, we assess the extent to which 
the price war changes consumers’ responsiveness to price promotions.  
Second, the price war literature has mainly looked at the price wars’ consequences 
for the initiators, e.g. the retailers (see Heil and Helsen 2001 for a review). As a result, the 
consequences for third parties, e.g. individual brands in the assortment of a retailer, remain 
under-investigated. In this essay, we focus on this aspect from the perspective of the 
manufacturer. The latter’s objectives may not be aligned with those of the retailers 
(Srinivasan et al. 2004). A price war among supermarket chains (such as the one we study) 
is initiated by retailers to attract customers to their stores (i.e. to increase store traffic), by 
improving their price image and to prevent consumers from switching to competitors. 
These objectives do not necessarily match manufacturers’ interest in maximizing their 
brands’ sales and market shares. For example, the lower in-store price level may amplify 
consumers’ attention to prices rather than quality, modifying consumers’ purchases in 
favor of cheaper alternatives. If the relative price of the manufacturer’s goods deteriorates 
due to the in-store price reductions, the manufacturer may experience a decrease in sales. 
Third, we extend the price war literature by looking at two different scenarios 
within the price war: (1) an indirect price-war scenario, where the regular prices of 
competing brands are reduced while the regular price of the focal brand remains unaffected 
(see Figure 3.1), and (2) a direct price-war scenario where the regular prices of both the 
competing brands and the focal brand itself are reduced. During these two scenarios, the 
relative price position of the brand may change differently. Consequently, consumers’ 
responses to sales promotions may not be the same under the two regimes.  
Fourth, the effect of the price war may change over time. On the one hand, 
Helson’s adaptation-level theory (1964) suggests that price sensitivity decreases as 
consumers become used to the lower price level. On the other hand, van Heerde et al. 
(2008) find an increase in price sensitivity (see also paragraph 3.2.2). Therefore, it is 
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unclear how this will affect sales volumes as well as price-promotion effectiveness. We 
therefore investigate whether sales promotion effectiveness decreases or increases over 
time for brands indirectly and directly involved in the price reductions. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the key contribution of this paper vis-à-vis the extant 
literature on price wars, based on the four points discussed above. The remainder of this 
chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of the price 
war literature. Then we present the implications of the price war for sales and sales 
promotions. Next, we introduce the model, the data and the results. Finally, we discuss the 
key findings and suggest directions for future research. 
Table 3.1. Selection of empirical studies on price wars24 
3.2. Literature review 
The term price war has typically been used to refer to periods of excessive rivalry 
among firms whereby price is used as the main weapon in the competitive interaction (e.g. 
Rao et al. 2000). Based on an extensive review of previous literature, Heil and Helsen 
(2001) provide a comprehensive definition of price wars. They define a price war as when 
one or more of the following criteria are met: (1) the direction of the pricing is 
                                                        
 
24 The study of Heil and Helsen (2001) is not empirical, but theoretical, and as such it is not included in Table 3.1.  
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Fabra and Toro (2004) √  √   √  
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“downward,” (2) the pricing interaction among the actors occurs at a much faster rate than 
normal, (3) the actions and reactions focus mainly on the competitors, rather than on the 
customers, (4) the competitive interaction violates industry norms, (5) the pricing 
interaction as a whole is undesirable to the competitors, (6) the competitors neither 
intended nor expected to ignite the price war through their preceding competitive behavior, 
and (7) this pricing interplay is believed to be unsustainable (Heil and Helsen 2001: 89).  
Price wars occur in every kind of industry, from airline or energy businesses to 
food grocers (Table 3.2) (for an extensive review, see Heil and Helsen 2001). In the 
remainder, we focus exclusively on price wars initiated by and between grocery retailers. 
For example, in November 2008, due to the economic downturn, the leading British 
retailers, Asda, Marks and Spencer, Sainsbury and Tesco lowered their prices in order to 
increase their market share, triggering a new price war (after the price wars started in 1998 
and 2004 by Asda) (Time 2008). We find a similar scenario in the US with the price wars 
initiated by Kroger in 2001, by Rainbow and Cub Food in 2002 and by Giant Eagle in 
2003, causing retailers’ margins to shrink and several smaller grocery stores to close 
(Progressive Grocer 2003). In a similar vein, Albert Heijn, the Dutch grocery market 
leader, wanted to improve their price image and regain the market share lost to hard 
discounters (Sloot 2004). On October 20, 2003, Albert Heijn announced a permanent price 
reduction for more than 1000 products, involving mainly A-brands. The competitors 
reacted within the same week, matching or even exceeding the price reductions (see van 
Heerde et al. 2008 for more details). This price war lasted for more than two years, 
squeezing grocery prices and impacting heavily on retailers’ and suppliers’ profitability 
(Sloot 2005).  
In sum, price wars between grocery retailers occur frequently and in different 
geographical markets. Before elaborating on how these price wars affect sales and price 
promotion effectiveness, we briefly discuss what typically triggers them (3.2.1) and the 
scope of their consequences (3.2.2). 
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Table 3.2. Examples of price wars (adapted from Heil and Helsen 2001) 
Business* Location Date 
Bus rides (Greyhound, Peter Pan Trailways) New York, Washington 1992 
Car rentals (Avis, Budget, Hertz, National) US 1992 
Tires (Goodyear, Michelin, Pirelli) Europe 1992 
PC software (Borland, Lotus, Microsoft) US 1993 
Laser printers (Apple, HP) US 1994 
Minivans (Chrysler, GM) US 1995 
Salty snacks (Eagle Snack, Frito Lay) US 1996 
Beers (Coors, Miller) US 1998 
Contact lenses (Bausch and Lomb, Cooper Vision) US 1998 
Hamburgers (McDonald’s) Japan, US 1998 
Pizza chains (Little Caesar’s, Pizza Hut) US 1998 
Video games (Nintendo) US 1998, 2002 
Mutual funds (Fidelity) US 1998, 2008 
Greeting cards (American Greetings, Hallmark) US 1999 
Notebooks (Compaq, Sony) US 2007 
HD DVD players (Toshiba) Worldwide 2008 
Health insurance (Aetna, Humana) US 2009 
Grocery (Food Lion, HFB) Houston 1997 
Grocery (Asda, Tesco) UK 1998, 2004 
Grocery (Kroger) US 2001 
Grocery (Food Lion, Kash n’ Karry) US 2002 
Grocery (Cub Food, Rainbow) US 2002 
Grocery (Albert Heijn) The Netherlands 2003 
Grocery (Giant Eagle) US 2003 
Grocery (Asda, Sainsbury, Tesco) UK 2008 
*Table 3.2 reports the initiators of the price war, or the main actors involved in the initial price 
reductions. 
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3.2.1. Antecedents of price wars 
The extant price-war literature has mainly provided insights into the antecedents 
of the price war. This stream of literature is mostly characterized by analytical work. Three 
groups can be distinguished, based on the events that are thought to have triggered the 
price war: (1) demand fluctuations, (2) firms’ reputation, and (3) financial conditions. 
Specifically,   
(1) The triggering event lies within demand fluctuations. Depending on the 
assumptions made, price wars can occur (a) during economic downturns 
(e.g. Green and Porter 1984, Staiger and Wolak 1992), or (b) during boom 
times (e.g. Rotemberg and Saloner 1986).  
(a) During economic downturns, price wars can occur because of (i) a 
firm’s cost structures, (ii) unobservable prices, or (iii) a 
misunderstanding of the competitive interaction. Specifically,  
(i) When the demand is low, firms’ cost structures can generate a 
price war, in particular when a firm has high fixed costs to cover 
(Scherer and Ross 1990, Staiger and Wolak 1992). For example, 
when part of a firm’s capacity is not used and produces no returns, 
the overcapacity can create an incentive for the firm to adopt a 
volume-oriented pricing strategy by undercutting its competitors’ 
prices (Scherer and Ross 1990). These competitors may over-react 
with retaliatory price cuts, instigating a price war (e.g. Busse 
2000, Schunk 1999).  
(ii) Price wars can occur when a firm cannot observe the prices of its 
competitors. Therefore, a fall in the demand of its own output can 
be interpreted as a sign that the competitor has offered a “secret” 
price cut (Green and Porter 1984). This may lead to retaliatory 
price cuts, triggering a price war.  
(iii) Price wars can also emerge without a real predatory strategy, as 
the outcome of a misunderstanding of the competitive interactions 
that causes competitors to over-react (Schunk 1999).  
(b) During a booming economy, price wars can occur because the benefit 
from undercutting can result in larger immediate revenues than during 
recessions, damaging the competitive interplay (e.g. Rotemberg and 
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Saloner 1986). Deleersnyder et al. (2004), for example, find that during 
economic contractions companies tend to increase prices, while they 
tend to cut them during economic expansion. 
(2) The triggering event of the price war is related to the reputation of the firm 
(e.g. Kreps and Wilson 1982, Milgrom and Roberts 1982). This reputation 
may come to play in case of a competitive entry. When the incumbent tries 
to push the entrant out of the market, or when the entrant tries to gain an 
immediate market share at the expense of the incumbent, price wars are 
likely to erupt. In fact, the new entry induces the incumbent to take actions 
to create a reputation of toughness and to discourage future entries (e.g. 
Elzinga and Mills 1999, Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Organski 1969). The 
studies of Klemperer (1989) and Elzinga and Mills (1999) illustrate that 
price wars are especially triggered by actual entry in markets where the 
customers of new entrants incur switching costs. In fact, to attract new 
customers who will incur switching costs (as a result of switching from the 
incumbent to the new entrant), the entrant needs to offer (temporary) lower 
prices. The incumbent reacts by lowering the prices as well, starting a price 
war. Once the entrant has established a clientele, the price war stops, and the 
firms (can) raise their prices again. This theory finds empirical evidence in 
the wholesale distribution of generic cigarettes in 1984–1985, analyzed by 
Elzinga and Mills (1999). 
(3) Firms’ financial conditions are also identified as one of the causes of price 
wars (e.g. Bhattacharya 1997, Busse 2002). A firm that initiates a price war 
gains higher current profits at the expense of lower future profits. This is 
valued more by a financially distressed company. For example, if a firm is 
on the verge of bankruptcy, it is more likely to “borrow” returns from future 
periods by initiating a price war (Busse 2002). Busse (2002) offers empirical 
support to this thesis using data on the airline industry between 1985 and 
1992. Not only firms risking bankruptcy but also firms facing reductions in 
their revenues and market share to the advantage of a competitor might 
ignite a price war, as shown by the work of Fabra and Toro (2005) on the 
Spanish electricity market. Van Heerde et al. (2008), Griffith and Rust 
(1997) and Leeflang and Wittink (1996) argue that price wars often start 
when managers are focused on minimizing the difference in market shares 
and profits relative to the competition. To pursue this competitive-oriented 
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objective, they are willing to sacrifice absolute profits for relative standing in 
market shares and profits versus other firms (Griffith and Rust 1997: 115). 
The grocery Dutch price war studied by van Heerde et al. (2008) offers a 
clear example of this scenario, as the war among retailers was initiated by 
the market leader in an attempt to regain customers lost to hard discounters. 
3.2.2. Consequences of price wars 
Overall, price wars may affect four performance measures: (1) sales, (2) margins 
and profits, (3) choice sets, and (4) firms’ reputations.  
(1) The initiator of the price war sets lower prices that attract higher sales (e.g. 
Elzinga and Mills 1999, Fabra and Toro 2005, Scherer and Ross 1990). Van 
Heerde et al. (2008) show empirically that this sales effect is only temporary. 
During a price war among Dutch grocery retailers, consumers’ basket size 
increases (in value) in the short run, but it tends to shrink to the old level as 
the price war evolves. The heavily advertised permanent price decreases 
create a “psychological income”: the price war’s sudden promise of huge 
savings induces consumers to increase their spending disproportionally in 
the short run. In the long run, consumers’ spending decreases, while their 
price sensitivity increases with every new wave of price reductions (van 
Heerde et al. 2008).  
(2) As the competitor reacts, the whole market faces lower profits (e.g. Griffith 
and Rust 1997), eventually leading to a reduction in the number of 
competitors because of the bankruptcy and/or market exit of some of the 
competing firms (e.g. Busse 2002, Milgrom and Roberts 1982).  
(3) As consumers tend to base their choices on price (van Heerde et al. 
2008), firms have an additional incentive to continue an undercutting pricing 
strategy. This competitive interaction can force firms to modify their cost 
structures (or to exit from the market), undermining consumer welfare by 
reducing the set of choices and/or the overall quality of the products 
(Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996). 
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(4) Finally, the price war can create a credible reputation for the firms involved, 
and can help prevent future market instability by discouraging new entries or 
predatory pricing (e.g. Levenstein 1997).  
To summarize, the price war literature has mainly focused its attention on the 
causes leading to a price war, only partially covering its consequences. Moreover, all the 
price-war effects tend to be discussed from the point of view of the initiator and its 
competitors, e.g. the retailers. However, little is known about the consequences for third 
parties, e.g. the brands of the manufacturers in the assortment of a retailer, that may suffer 
(or benefit) from the situation as a result. 
3.3. Impact of price wars on sales and sales promotions 
Three key factors may be altered during the indirect and direct price war, 
potentially modifying sales and sales promotions: (1) price sensitivity, (2) consumers’ 
income, and (3) the way promotions are implemented. 
(1) Price sensitivity. During the price war, the lower level of the prices increases 
the attention to the price dimension (van Heerde et al. 2008, van Aalst et al. 
2005). As such, consumers may use prices more than quality signs to 
compare different alternatives. This way, they may be drawn to cheaper 
offers.  
(2) Income effect. The reduced in-store prices may also generate an income 
effect. Consumers may directly observe an increase in their real disposable 
income (which depends on whether the brands they usually purchase become 
cheaper). Moreover, the numerous bargains announced inside and outside 
the stores by the retailers may bias consumers’ perceptions, creating also a 
“psychological income” effect (Heilman et al. 2002, van Heerde et al. 
2008).25 
(3) Promotion implementation. As price wars force firms to reduce their prices, 
ceteris paribus, fewer resources are left to support their products and price 
                                                        
 
25 An illustration of the “psychological income” effect on sales can be found in Heilman et al. (2002): consumers 
receiving a monetary reward before entering a store, spend more in the store, far above the monetary reward. 
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promotion events. Therefore, the implementation of price promotions may 
have to be altered (see paragraph 3.4).26 
The resulting effects of these three factors on sales and promotional effectiveness 
may differ for brands not engaged in the price reductions (indirect price war), from those 
directly involved (direct price war), as discussed below and summarized in Table 3.3. 
3.3.1. Indirect price war 
As the overall retailers’ price levels decrease (including the price of competing 
brands), the actual and perceived relative price of a focal brand increases. Given the high 
price sensitivity characterizing the price war (van Heerde et al. 2008), we can expect lower 
sales for the focal brand. As for the promotional effectiveness, previous research has 
shown that higher relative prices are associated with higher promotional effectiveness 
(Bell et al. 1999, Narasimhan et al. 1996).  
At the same time, due to the lower store prices, more money may be left over that 
can be spent by consumers on a given manufacturer’s product not involved in the price 
cuts. This may be due to the fact that the savings allow them to afford superior, high-
quality brands and enjoy the feeling of getting a great deal (Chandon et al. 2000). While 
this increase of the disposable income (even if only “psychological”) may positively affect 
baseline sales, it may negatively influence promotional effectiveness, as higher-income 
consumers tend to be less sensitive to price promotions (Ailawadi et al. 2006).  
The price war may also impact the way promotions are implemented, modifying 
sales promotion effectiveness. On the one hand, retailers may become more demanding, 
and ask higher promotional support from the manufacturers, or reduce the pass-through for 
all brands. At the same time, manufacturers may be willing to provide retailers with better 
deals (e.g. steeper discounts and more frequent promotions) to help their brands to remain 
competitive. As for features and displays, we may observe a decrease, since they are 
relatively less used to communicate price promotions, and retailers will mainly employ 
them to announce to consumers their permanent price cuts to gain store traffic, market 
                                                        
 
26 Although the lower margin may be compensated by an increase in volumes sold, retailers’ and manufacturers’ 
profits tend to shrink during price wars (Busse 2002, Milgrom and Roberts 1982). This is due to the competitive 
interactions that further reduce margins at every new price war round. Industry reports and the popular press 
confirm that this occurred in the Netherlands, UK and USA, where the profitability of both retailers and 
manufacturers was hit by retailers’ price wars (Time 2008, van Aalst et al. 2005). 
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share and sales. Given that features and displays are linked with higher promotional 
effectiveness (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2005), a reduction in their use may modify the 
effectiveness of a discount. This effect may differ depending on the relative price of the 
focal brand. For example, Lemon and Nowlis (2002) find that the combination of feature 
advertising and price promotions, or of display and price promotions, is less effective for 
brands with a higher relative price, like those facing an indirect price war. 
3.3.2. Direct price war 
If a focal brand is part of a direct price-war regime, its relative price may have 
improved or may have deteriorated (depending on the price of the competing brands). If 
the relative price is improved, this could result in switching in favor of the focal brand. 
Also, consumers may find an additional incentive to take advantage of the brand when on 
promotion (as the savings from the temporary discount are added to the savings from the 
lower permanent price). This would lead to higher baseline sales and promotional 
effectiveness.  
If the relative price deteriorates instead, then we can expect lower regular sales. 
The high price sensitivity may induce consumers to purchase a cheaper alternative (van 
Heerde et al. 2008), or to buy the brand only when on promotion, leading to higher 
promotional effectiveness (Bell et al. 1999, Narasimhan et al. 1996).  
Other factors may be at play. For example, the income effect may increase 
baseline sales, while decreasing promotional effectiveness. We could expect this to happen 
even in case of a deterioration of the relative price of the focal brand, due to the 
“psychological income” effect discussed above for the indirect price-war scenario.  
Finally, promotion implementation may change, modifying its effectiveness. The 
lower regular price of the focal brand reduces the margin of the retailer (Busse 2002), 
leaving fewer resources available to implement price promotion activities with the same 
depth and frequency as before. While a lower depth of the discount may decrease the 
effectiveness of sales promotions, a longer inter-promotional time may increase it (e.g. 
Blattberg et al. 1995), making it hard to predict the resulting effect. Also, as retailers now 
need to advertise both their permanent and temporary price cuts, the proportion of features 
and displays dedicated to temporary price reductions may decrease. Hence, the augmented 
number of price cues outside and inside the store may reduce the effectiveness of these 
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instruments (Anderson and Simester 2003), therefore impacting on consumers’ response to 
sales promotions. 
3.3.3. Evolution over time 
The novelty of the price war and the intensity of price cues may diminish over 
time. Given that these factors are positively linked to price sensitivity (Taylor and 
Thompson 1982, Wathieu et al. 2004), one could expect a decrease in price sensitivity 
(Helson 1964). Still, as price wars are characterized by several waves of price reductions, 
price sensitivity may instead increase when more brands are involved over time (van 
Heerde et al. 2008). This may harm the sales of brands facing an indirect price war, as they 
may be the only brands not yet reduced in price. Which of these two effects will prevail 
remains to be tested empirically.  
Moreover, as time progresses, consumers update their reference price to a lower 
level (e.g. Briesch et al. 1997, Monroe 1990). As such, their perception of “huge savings” 
may be reduced (Fiske and Taylor 1991, Lichtenstein et al. 1991), decreasing regular sales. 
At the same time, as consumers use the updated (lower) reference price to evaluate sales 
promotions, the depth of the discount may be reduced, thereby decreasing the effectiveness 
of sales promotions. 
To conclude, because of the opposing forces described above, we cannot make 
directional hypotheses on the price war’s effects. Therefore, we investigate the indirect and 
direct impacts of the price war in an exploratory way. 
Table 3.3. Summary of the effects 
         Indirect price war    Direct price war 
 Sales Promotion effectiveness Sales Promotion effectiveness 
Relative price - + -/+ + 
Income effect + - + - 
Promotion implementation  -/+  -/+ 
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3.4. Impact on sales promotion implementation 
Indirect and direct price wars can also change the effectiveness of the sales 
promotion implementation tools: i.e. the timing of the discount, the deal depth, features 
and displays.  
Timing. Generally speaking, the literature on the timing of the discount is 
controversial. On the one hand, deals with longer inter-promotion time increase the 
saliency of each individual promotion, leading to more attractive deals (Bell et al. 1999). 
On the other hand, previous research has found that more frequent deals work better 
(Neslin 2002). During a price war, this second argument may hold given the high level of 
price sensitivity. Promotions implemented after a shorter inter-promotion time may be 
needed to keep the brand competitive. This may be especially relevant when the relative 
price of the brand deteriorates (e.g. during an indirect price-war scenario).  
Deal depth. Retailers and manufacturers may also have to rethink the impact of 
the depth of the discount. Brands facing an indirect price war may need deeper discounts to 
compensate for their higher relative prices and, thus, to stimulate sales. For brands 
involved in the price reductions, instead, less steep discounts may already be very 
effective, as consumers may confuse the permanent price reductions and the temporary 
price discounts. Nevertheless, during a direct price war, the same percentage of the 
discount represents a lower absolute price cut that may not exceed the “just noticeable 
difference,” i.e. the minimum discount threshold that could have an incentive value 
(Campbell and Diamond 1990, Monroe 1971). In this case, a deeper percentage of the 
discount may be needed to match the pre-price war discount in absolute terms. 
Features and displays. During price wars, consumers’ store choice is based on 
the overall price image of the store (van Heerde et al. 2008). Consequently, features may 
become more important, as they attract consumers to the stores. Once inside the stores, 
(given the high price sensitivity) consumers may select also what to buy on the basis of 
price. Displays may then be more effective. However, as retailers now communicate their 
permanent and temporary lower prices, this overload of signs with price cues could 
decrease the effectiveness of both features and displays (Anderson and Simester 2003). 
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3.5. Method 
To investigate promotional effectiveness before versus during the price war, we 
proceed in two steps. In the first step, we use the individual promotion approach discussed 
at length in Chapter 2 (see paragraph 2.3). We therefore express the sales of each brand (at 
a focal retailer) as a function of all the promotions implemented at that focal retailer and 
other covariates. This way, we obtain not an average sales response to sales promotions, 
but individual parameters for each promotion event.  
We further extend the model described in E3 to account for a shift in sales due to 
the price war by means of two step dummy variables, capturing the instantaneous effect of 
the indirect price war (INDIRECT_PW) and of (the incremental impact of) the direct price 
war (DIRECT_PW), respectively (see paragraph 3.3). The dummy variable 
INDIRECT_PWt assumes the value of 1 during the entire length of the price war, and 0 
otherwise, while the dummy variable DIRECT_PWi,c,j,t equals 1 when the price of product i 
at retailer j is permanently reduced because of the price war (see Figure 3.1).27 To capture 
the evolution of sales during the indirect and direct price war, we add two trend variables 
(TREND_INDIRECT_PW = 1, …, T’  and TREND_DIRECT_PW = 1, …, T’’) that start 
counting at 1 one week after the beginning of the indirect and direct price war, 
respectively.28 29 
As the promotional dummy variables PROMO capture individual events p over 
time, we do not need to add an interaction with the price war. Knowing when each 
promotion event p has been implemented, i.e. before or during the price war, allows us 
                                                        
 
27 Additionally, one could add two continuous variables capturing the number of competitive brands involved in 
the price war within the same category, and/or in other categories. A similar approach has been used by van 
Heerde et al. (2008), whereby they considered all the items involved in the price war, with no distinction across 
categories. Moreover, one could further extend the model with another variable capturing the relative price of the 
focal product, as it plays an important role in this context. These additions to the model may provide important 
insights into the competitive dynamics and the evolution of the price war over time. Unfortunately, we cannot 
incorporate these extensions, as we have only fragmented information related to the competing brands. 
28 For both INDIRECT_PW  and TREND_INDIRECT_PW,  we need only a subscript t, as we assume the price 
war to start in the same week t for all brands and retailers. This is the case in the price war studied in this chapter 
and in most of the examples reported in Table 3.2. In other examples of price wars (e.g. car rentals, contact 
lenses, health insurances, pizza chains, video games), the competitors reacted to the lower prices of the initiator of 
the price war with some delay, entering the price war at different stages. In those instances, one should allow both 
INDIRECT_PW  and TREND_INDIRECT_PW to vary across brands and retailers.  
29 If the brand is directly involved in the price reductions from the first week of the price war, the parameters 
related to INDIRECT_PW  and TREND_INDIRECT_PW are set to zero. This happens for two of the products in 
our dataset. (Our conclusions remain substantively the same even when these two products are excluded from the 
analysis.)     
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easily to test for differences in the parameters before versus during the price war in the 
second step of the analysis. 
We checked the necessity of adding other interactions of the price war with 
variables such as the competing promotion events (CP) or advertising (ADSTOCK). In 
both cases, these interactions were not significant in 82% and 93% of the cases, 
respectively (p > .05). When significant, these interactions were added to the model. 
 The final model for the first step is: 
(E6) SALESi,c,j,t = α0,i,c,j + α1,i,c,j INDIRECT_PWt + α2,i,c,j DIRECT_PWi,c,j,t  + 
      α3,i,c,j TREND_INDIRECT_PWt +  
      α4,i,c,j TREND_DIRECT_PWi,c,j,t  +  
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where i indicates the ith product (i = 1,..., I), c represents the category (c = 1,..., C), j the 
chain (j = 1,..., J), and t the week (t = 1,..., T). SALESi,c,j,t refers to the sales in volume, 
while βi,c,j,p,l expresses the parameter for the impact of individual promotion event p (p = 
1,..., P) in week t - l (l = 0, 1, 2) of product i of category c at retailer j. CPi,c,j’,t  depicts the 
competitive promotions by the same product i at a competing retailer j’, and ADSTOCKi,c,t 
corresponds to the advertising goodwill of product i in week t. Sin (2πt/52) and cos 
(2πt/52) allow to correct for seasonal fluctuations in the series. 
The model is estimated for all retailers simultaneously, by means of iterative 
SUR-GLS with Prais–Winsten correction (van Heerde et al. 2004). The error is therefore 
distributed as in Chapter 2: 
εi,c,j,t  = ρ i,c,j εi,c,j,t-1 + υ,c,j,t   
εi,c,j’,t  = ρ i,c,j’ εi,c,j’,t-1 + υi,c,j’,t   
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cov [υi,c,j,t , υi,c,j’,t] = σi,c,j,j’  
 
where υi,c,j,t ~N(0,      ) and υi,c,j’,t ~ N(0,       ). To be able to compare promotional 
effectiveness across different products (with different baseline sales), we compute the 
normalized total effect of each promotion event (TE*) as: 
 
(E7)  TE*i,c,j,p =         
 
i,c,j,p,l /BASELINE_SALES i, c, j, z(p) 
 
where the baseline sales are expressed differently depending on the price war scenario, 
z(p), that the brand is facing at the time of promotion event p: z(p) equals 1 if the 
promotion event p is implemented before the price war, it equals 2 during the indirect price 
war, and 3 during the direct price war. Therefore, the baseline sales are equal to the 
average non-promotional sales of product i at retailer j computed during each period z. The 
standard errors of TE* are derived through the Delta method (Greene 2003). 
In the second step, we use TE* as the dependent variable and the inverse of the 
standard errors as weights in the regression model (Judge et al. 1985). We then relate the 
normalized total effect (TE*) to the indirect (INDIRECT_PW) and the direct price war 
(DIRECT_PW). Moreover, we test whether the price-war effects decrease over time, by 
adding two trend variables to the model that start counting one week after the beginning of 
the indirect and direct price war (TIME_LAG_INDIRECT_PW and TIME_LAG_DIRECT_ 
PW).  
The model is further augmented to include the impact of the most important 
drivers found in Chapter 2, i.e. the timing since previous promotion events at the same 
retailer, TIMING, or at competing retailers (TIMING_COMP and SIMULTANEOUS), the 
depth of the discount (DEPTH), the duration (DURATION) as well as features (FEATURE) 
and displays (DISPLAY). As discussed in Chapter 2, we also include additional covariates 
that may influence promotional effectiveness, such as advertising (ADSTOCK), market 
share (MKTSHARE) and category concentration (CONCENTRATION). We refer to 
Chapter 2 for the operationalization of these variables (paragraph 2.4.2). 
To account for variation across the retailer and categories, we use a fixed-effect 
correction for the retailer (DRj) and categories (DCc). To capture within-brand correlations, 
we use a random effect correction for the brands (ui). The error term νi,c,j,p  is assumed to 
follow a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σv².   
∑
=
2
0l
β
jci ,,
2υσ jci ′,,2υσ
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The model is as follows:30 
 
(E8) TE*i,c,j,p = μ1  +     μj DRj +     μ′c DCc +  
           γ1 INDIRECT_PWp + γ 2 DIRECT_PW i,c,j,p +  
           γ 3 TIME_LAG_ INDIRECT_PW p  +  
           γ 4 TIME_LAG_ DIRECT_PW i,c,j,p +  
          ξ1  Log(TIMING)i,c,j,p + ξ 2  Log(TIMING_COMP)i,c,j,p +  
          ξ 3  SIMULTANEOUS i,c,j,p + ξ 4  Log(DEPTH)i,c,j,p + 
          ξ 5  Log(DURATION)i,c,j,p + ξ 6 FEATUREi,c,j,p + 
          ξ 7  DISPLAYi,c,j,p + ξ 8  Log(ADSTOCK)i,c,p +     
          ξ 9  Log(MKTSHARE)i,c,j+ ξ 10  Log(CONCENTRATION)i,c,j+ 
          ui  + ν i,c,j,p 
3.6. Data 
3.6.1. Sample composition  
The dataset extends the sample described in Chapter 2, as it includes the 
promotions for 2001-2005. The data are collected in the Netherlands, at four leading 
national supermarket chains, Retailer 1, Retailer 2, Retailer 3 and Retailer 4 (for more 
information see paragraph 2.4). As mentioned above, these supermarket chains entered a 
price war (triggered by Retailer 1) on October 20, 2003.31 Consequently, their price and 
service image changed during the price war (see Figure 3.2) (van Heerde et al. 2008). 
Figure 3.2 shows how the positioning map of the Dutch supermarkets differs across the 
                                                        
 
30 For reasons of parsimony, we do not show the subscript for the annual variation in the control variables. 
31 The time window of the sample used in Chapter 2 ended on October 20, 2003. 
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years 2002–2004, with a repositioning of the price image of supermarket chains previously 
considered expensive, like Retailer 1 (GfK 2005).  
Figure 3.2. Relative position of the Dutch supermarkets (source: GfK 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dataset covers 147 weeks before the price war, from January 2001 to October 
20, 2003, and 114 weeks during the price war (until the end of 2005). We observe a total 
of 687 promotions, 374 implemented before the price war32 and 313 during the price war, 
from 22 brands of a leading multinational PCG manufacturer, in eight product categories. 
In the second step we excluded ten promotions. Four of them were removed 
because they were the only ones implemented in a scenario where the prices of the entire 
category (and therefore also the prices of competing brands) were not reduced by the price 
war (which we may refer to as a category indirect price-war effect). We deleted the 
remaining six because the price of the focal brand increased during the price war. 
Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we conducted the analysis including these ten 
                                                        
 
32 Of the sample used in Chapter 2, eight products were discontinued between 2003 and early 2004, impeding the 
comparison of their promotional effectiveness before versus during the price war. We therefore excluded them 
from the analysis. This explains why we now have 374 sales promotions instead of the 519 analysed in Chapter 2.  
Inexpensive 
□    Retailer 3 
High service Low service 
□    Retailer 4 
□    Retailer 1 
□   Retailer 2 
■    Retailer 4 
■    Retailer 1 
■    Retailer 2 
■    Retailer 3 
Expensive 
□  Before the price war (2002)         ■   During the price war (2004) 
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promotions in the dataset, with the addition of two dummy variables, one capturing the 
category indirect effect (i.e. assuming the value of 1 when the prices of competing brands 
were not reduced by the price war) and one capturing the price increase. The results were 
similar to those reported below. 
3.6.2. Some first descriptive statistics 
The Dutch price war started on October 20, 2003 and lasted until the end of 2005. 
Within the first week, all the main competitors reacted to the price cuts of the leading 
retailer. After that, prices were lowered in a series of waves, involving different product 
categories and brands in every new round (Table 3.4).  
Table 3.4. Price war rounds (adapted from van Heerde et al. 2008) 
 
 
The business press highlighted several changes caused by the price war in the 
retailing landscape. First, the overall level of prices for national grocery brands was 
reduced, on average, by 11% (van Heerde et al. 2008). Every new wave of price reductions 
increased consumers’ attention to the price dimension (Sloot and van Aalst 2005, van 
Heerde et al. 2008). Van Heerde et al. (2008) show that during the price war, there was a 
significant decrease in the percentage of consumers choosing which brand to purchase on 
the basis of brand/product characteristics other than price. 
Date Initiator Number of 
products 
Emphasis on 
October 20, 2003  Retailer 1 1000 National brands 
October 27, 2003 Retailer 1 550 National brands 
November 10, 2003 Retailer 1 300 National brands and dairy 
January 19, 2004 Retailer 1 500 National brands and produce 
March 8, 2004 Retailer 1 100 Meat 
May 10, 2004 Retailer 1 100 Cheese 
September 20, 2004 Retailer 1 1000 Private labels 
November 13, 2004 Retailer 1 2000 National brands 
January 30, 2005 Retailer 1 1000 National brands, cleaning and personal care 
February 21, 2005 Retailer 1 100 Meat and cheese 
March 7, 2005 Retailer 2 250 National brands and private labels 
April 4, 2005 Retailer 2 250 National brands and private labels 
August 23, 2005 Retailer 4 600 National brands 
September 12, 2005 Retailer 1 100 Cleaning and personal care 
October 31, 2005 Retailer 1 1000 National brands 
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Because of the fierce price competition, the price level changed over time. For 
example, during the first week of the price war Retailer 1 reduced the price of a 1.5 liter 
bottle of Coca Cola by 9% (from a starting price of €1.23 to €1.12), and by another 9% 
during the following week (to €1.02)(van Heerde et al. 2008) (Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3. Permanent price reductions (source: van Heerde et al. 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prices did not only vary over time, but also across retailers (see Figure 3.3), 
impacting the retailers’ relative price positioning (as shown in Figure 3.2 and discussed 
above). Especially at the beginning of the price war, retailers were investing more money 
 
Retailer 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Retailer 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Retailer 4 
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in media advertisements and, in particular, on newspapers, to communicate their lower 
offers (“Newspapers earn millions thanks to the supermarket war,”33 De Financiële 
Telegraaf 2004). A selection of these announcements is exhibited in Figure 3.4.  
In all these announcements, the retailers emphasize the new rounds of 
permanently reduced prices of several products. They communicate own actions (for 
example, “Permanently reduced in price. Next round,”34 “The prices go even further 
down,”35 “Retailer 1 is again scattering around price reductions”36 etc.), as well as the 
competitors’ reactions (e.g. “Retailer 2 will keep being the cheapest, whatever Retailer 1 
tries,”37 “Nobody can stop us. Again hundreds of articles permanently reduced in price,”38 
etc.).  
As a result of this massive communication, lower prices service supermarkets, 
like Retailer 1 and Retailer 4, attracted more customers than other etailers, thereby 
increasing their sales by 5% (see the article “Service supermarkets are the winners of the 
price war”39 in the online report of RTL Z on the Dutch price war, 2003–200640). 
The popular press also highlighted that promotion frequency and promotion depth 
were reduced because of the price war (see the financial reports in RTL Z, “Price war in 
supermarkets”41 2003–2006), as manufacturers provided less promotional support to 
retailers (Sloot 2004).  
However, not every retailer reduced the frequency and the depth of the discounts. 
Retailer 4, for example, not only lowered its prices, but it accompanied its permanent price 
reductions with an aggressive special offer program in which buy one, get one for free 
program (BOGOF) played a major role (see Planet Retail, “Casino report,” pp. 7–8). 
In the next section, more descriptive information about the effects of the price war 
will be given. 
                                                        
 
33 “Dagbladen verdienen miljoenen aan supersupermarktoorlog.” 
34 “Blijvend in prijs verlaagd. Volgende ronde.”  
35 “De prijzen gaan nog verder naar beneden.” 
36 “Retailer 1 strooit weer met prijsverlagingen.” 
37 “Retailer 2 blijft veel goedkoper, wat Retailer 1 ook probeert.” 
38 “We zijn niet te stoppen! Alweer honderden artikelen blijvend in prijs verlaagd.” 
39 “Service-supermarkten winnaars prijsoorlog.” 
40 Available at http://www.rtl.nl/(/financien/rtlz/dossiers/)/components/financien/rtlz/nieuws/dossier/supermarkt 
_tekst.xml. 
41 “Prijzenoorlog in de supermarkten.” 
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Figure 3.4. Announcements of permanent price cuts during the Dutch price war 
3.6.3. Brief overview of the impact of the price war in the data 
We present a set of descriptive statistics with respect to changes in the regular 
price and promotion implementation. For example, the price war altered the price of 71% 
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of the brands in the dataset, showing an overall price reduction of 5%42 and great 
variability across retailers (see Figure 3.5).  
Moreover, the timing of the permanent price reductions differed across brands and 
retailers. Figure 3.6 shows the different length of the indirect price-war scenario (in weeks) 
across brands (reporting on the y-axis how many brands (in %) face the indirect price-war 
scenario for a given number of weeks). The figure illustrates that the price of some 
products was reduced immediately during the first week of the price war (week 1 in the 
figure), while the price of others was cut only 99 weeks after the start of the price war. In 
some instances (for 6 brands), the price was not reduced at all (week 114 in the figure). 
Therefore, the duration of the indirect and direct effect varies considerably across brands. 
Figure 3.5. Average price decrease during the price war (%), computed across all 
brands involved in the price war 
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42 The overall price reduction of 5% is the average of all the price reductions across all the brands directly 
involved in the price war computed as: (regular price during the direct price wari,c,j  - regular price before the 
price wari,c,j) / regular price before the price wari,c,j . 
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Figure 3.6. Number of weeks spent in the indirect scenario 
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The price war not only influenced the overall price level, but also the 
implementation of sales promotions, as illustrated in Table 3.5.43 We observe an overall 
decrease in the frequency of sales promotions and in the implementation of simultaneous 
promotions at competing retailers. Promotions also last longer, and are more often 
supported by means of features and displays than before the price war. For example, we 
observe a significant increase in the number of promotions implemented at Retailer 3 (66 
promotions in 147 weeks vs. 85 promotions in 114 weeks) (two-proportion z-test = 4.74, 
two-sided p-value < .01)44 and Retailer 4 (92 promotions in 147 weeks vs. 91 promotions 
in 114 weeks) (two-proportion z-test = 3.03, p < .01), but a significant decrease at Retailer 
1 (119 promotions in 147 weeks vs. 70 promotions in 114 weeks)(two-proportion z-test = 
3.10, p < .01) and Retailer 2 (97 promotions in 147 weeks vs. 57 promotions in 114 
weeks)(two-proportion z-test = 2.16, p < .01). Also, the depth of price promotions has been 
significantly reduced from 27% to 16% at Retailer 2, and from 20% to 14% at Retailer 4. 
During the price war, Retailer 1, the price war initiator, remained the retailer with the 
highest discounts (in percentages), offering on average a price cut of 23%, while retailers 
like Retailer 2 and Retailer 4 reduced the percentage of the discount, respectively, from  
                                                        
 
43 From the time series of the prices of the focal brands in our dataset, provided by ACNielsen, we identified 
temporary and permanent price cuts. Moreover, we double checked if we correctly coded the temporary 
promotions and the permanent price reductions through internal company data.  
44 In the reminder of the text, unless differently specified, all the p-values refer to two-sided p-values. 
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Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics 
 Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 Overall 
 
Before 
M 
(SD) 
During 
M 
(SD) 
Before 
M 
(SD) 
During 
M 
(SD) 
Before 
M 
(SD) 
During 
M 
(SD) 
Before 
M 
(SD) 
During 
M 
(SD) 
Before 
M 
(SD) 
During 
M 
(SD) 
PLANNING 
           
TIMING (weeks) 5.50 (14.21) 
 
9.80 
(11.03) 
 
4.34 
(11.06) 
 
8.84 
(14.06) 
 
6.75 
(12.56) 
 
6.58 
(9.09) 
 
3.05 
(8.40) 
 
4.16 
(6.93) 
 
4.82 
(11.37) 
7.03 
(.9.26) 
TIMING_COMP (weeks) 
6.83 
(8.29) 
 
7.91 
(7.98) 
 
7.58 
(16.49) 
 
6.27 
(5.59) 
 
5.83 
(12.76) 
 
7.18 
(8.48) 
 
6.30 
(8.12) 
 
6.64 
(7.07) 
 
6.43 
(10.28) 
 7.21 
(7.40) 
SIMULTANEOUS 
(frequency %)* 
69.66 
 
11.27 
 
48.45 
 
13.56 
 
74.24 
 
28.24 
 
57.61 
 
27.17 
 
62.00 
 
21.24 
 
DEPTH (%) 21.02 (11.08) 
 
22.55 
(7.02) 
 
27.21 
(15.32) 
 
15.87 
(12.98) 
 
16.66 
(5.35) 
 
16.34 
(7.87) 
 
19.94 
(9.18) 
 
13.53 
(10.35) 
 
21.61 
(10.48) 
 
16.33 
(9.41) 
 
DURATION (weeks) 1.50 (0.96) 
 
2.16 
(0.46) 
 
1.74 
(1.09) 
 
2.23 
(0.75) 
 
1.16 
(0.67) 
 
2.09 
(0.29) 
 
1.51 
(1.05) 
 
1.96 
(0.43) 
 
1.49 
(0.75) 
 
 2.21 
(0.56) 
 
COMMUNICATION  
(vs. in-store shelf tag) 
 
          
FEATURE (frequency 
%)* 
43.91 
 
94.37 
 
73.11 
 
94.92 
 
6.97 
 
18.24 
 
38.91 
 
74.57 
 
43.73 
 
67.17 
 
DISPLAY (frequency %)* 9.52 
 
14.08 
 
.89 
 
9.78 
 
4.23 
 
60 
 
2.11 
 
16.09 
 
4.53 
 
26.76 
 
ADSTOCK (in 100,000 
euro) 
47.54 
(112.45) 
 
52.78 
(84.66) 
 
52.82 
(83.48) 
 
85.01 
(132.02) 
 
8.12 
(165.40) 
 
35.89 
(205.74) 
 
12.67 
(28.08) 
 
15.43 
(136.41) 
 
   33.38  
  120.81) 
 
  48.96  
(156.01) 
 
OTHER CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
 
        
  
MKTSHARE (%) 5.72 (4.43) 
 
7.03 
(4.60) 
  
6.13 
(4.23) 
  
6.62 
(4.27) 
 
5.99 
(4.49) 
  
5.25 
(4.67) 
  
5.72 
(4.27) 
 
6.25 
(4.63) 
 
5.90 
(4.41) 
6.75 
(4.59) 
CONCENTRATION (C3 
%) 
24.12 
(8.13) 
  
25.02 
(10.65) 
 
24.76 
(9.31) 
 
18.64 
(9.83) 
 
23.72 
(8.86) 
  
24.58 
(10.16) 
  
22.53 
(8.24) 
 
21.01 
(10.22) 
  
23.75 
(8.64) 
 
24.21 
(10.09) 
 
SAMPLE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
    
      
Number of promotions 119 70 97 57 66 85 92 91 374 283 
Number of weeks 147 114 147 114 147 114 147 114 147 114 
Average number of 
promotions per week 
.81 .61 .66 .50 .45 .74 .63 .80 2.54 2.48 
                      
*For the dummy variables, we report the frequency (%).
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27% to 16% (p < .01) and from 20% to 14% (p < .01), and Retailer 3 kept the discount 
depth around 16%. These preliminary descriptive statistics are in line with what was 
highlighted by the public press during the price war, and by managerial reports, as 
mentioned above (see also van Heerde et al. 2008).  
Moreover, we notice a significant change in how the promotions are 
communicated to consumers, increasing the usage of both features and display (see Table 
3.5 for details on the descriptive statistics).  
3.7. Results 
In the next paragraph, we first discuss the results of the effect of the price war on 
sales, and then describe the impact on promotional effectiveness and its drivers. 
3.7.1. Does a price war increase sales? 
To assess whether a price war increases sales, for each brand and retailer, we 
consider a set of parameters from E6 capturing the indirect and direct effects of the price 
war on sales at the beginning of the permanent price cuts, i.e. α1,i,c,j and (α1,i,c,j + α2,i,c,j), 
and over time, i.e. (α1,i,c,j + α3,i,c,j TREND_INDIRECT_PWt) and 
(α1,i,c,j + α2,i,c,j + α3,i,c,j TREND_INDIRECT_PWt + α4,i,c,jTREND_DIRECT_PWi,c,j,t). Their 
standard errors are derived through the Delta method. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the 
percentage of the positive (negative) signs of the instantaneous indirect and direct price-
war effects across our sample, together with their weighted average value. Table 3.8 and 
Figure 3.7 (panel A and B) present the evolution of these effects over time (Figure 3.7 
includes also the results for the effectiveness of price promotions, to be discussed later on). 
To check if the effects are significant, we follow the Stouffer’s meta-analytic test of 
“adding zs” by Mousteller and Bush (see Rosenthal 1991 for technical details). This 
method consists of pooling significance levels by using a standard normal table to convert 
the one-tailed p-value of each individual effect n (e.g. related to α1,i,c,j and  (α1,i,c,j + α2,i,c,j )) 
to a standard normal z. The meta z is computed as follows:  
(E9) 
N
z
meta
N
n
n∑
== 1z ,  
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where zn is the standard normal z of each effect n. This way, we obtain a new z-value that is 
then converted back into a one-tailed p-value, which tests whether sales, on average, 
increased significantly.45 Each z and p obtained by this procedure is displayed in Tables 
3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 as meta z and meta p.  
We observe a total of 86 effects for the indirect price war (22 brands times 4 
retailers, minus two cases where the brand’s price was directly reduced during the first 
week of the price war), and 64 effects for the direct price war (17 brands were involved in 
the direct price war at Retailer 1, 16 at Retailer 2 and 4, 14 at Retailer 3).  
Table 3.6 shows a higher percentage of brands experiencing a sales decrease than 
a sales increase at the beginning of the indirect price war (32% positive effects versus 46% 
negative effects). The weighted average (using as weights the reciprocal of the standard 
errors) of the normalized indirect price-war effects (which reflects the percentage sales 
change) is -.17.46 We also notice that, at the beginning of the indirect price war, while at 
Retailer 1, Retailer 2 and Retailer 4 there is a negative impact of the indirect price war on 
sales, at Retailer 3 there is a positive effect.  
Table 3.6. Percentage of significant effects of the beginning of the indirect price war 
on sales (two-sided p-value < .05) and weighted average normalized effects 
 
 (Initial) Indirect Effect (α1,i,c,j ) 
 
Positive Negative Not Significant Weighted 
Average 
Normalized 
Effect 
  Meta z       Meta      
       p* 
Total 32% 46% 24% -0.17 -1.45 0.07 
Retailer 1 28% 42% 29% -0.19 -3.22 <0.01 
Retailer 2 36% 52% 12% -0.18 -2.85 <0.01 
Retailer 3 44% 33% 23%  0.02  1.79 0.04 
Retailer 4 14% 57% 29% -0.12 -1.53 0.06 
N = 86       
* For the meta-analysis, we report one-tailed p-values. 
 
                                                        
 
45 Following van Heerde et al. (2008), we look at sales increase rather than decrease. 
46 To compare the indirect price-war effects across different products and retailers, we normalized them by 
dividing each effect by the baseline sales of the focal product during the indirect price war.  
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Table 3.7 illustrates that, at the beginning of the direct price war, when the price 
of a product has been reduced, sales tend to rise (for a total of 57% positive effects versus 
29% negative effects) and this pattern is consistent across all retailers. The weighted 
average of the normalized (initial) impact of the direct price war is .48.  
Table 3.7. Percentage of significant effects of the beginning of the direct price war on 
sales (two-sided p < .05) and weighted average normalized effects 
 
 (Initial) Direct Effect (α1,i,c,j + α2,i,c,j ) 
 
Positive Negative Not Significant Weighted 
Average 
Normalized 
Effect 
  Meta z   Meta   
    p* 
Total 57% 29% 14% 0.48 3.13 <0.01
Retailer 1 52% 39% 9% 0.58 2.45 <0.01
Retailer 2 57% 40% 3% 0.49 4.12 <0.01
Retailer 3 64% 14% 22% 0.23 2.99 <0.01
Retailer 4 59% 23% 18% 0.47 3.35 <0.01
N = 64      
* For the meta-analysis, we report one-tailed p-values. 
 
 
Over time, sales tend to decrease even further when the focal brand is not 
involved in the price reductions (α1,i,c,j + α3,i,c,j TREND_INDIRECT_PWt). The weighted 
average size of this decay (computed after normalizing α1,i,c,j + α3,i,c,j* 
TREND_INDIRECT_PWt and using the reciprocal of the standard errors as weights) is -.40 
after one quarter (when TREND_INDIRECT_PWt = 13), and -1.05 after one year from the 
start of the price war (when TREND_INDIRECT_PWt = 52). Instead, the weighted average 
of the normalized impact of the direct price war 
(α1,i,c,j + α2,i,c,j + α3,i,c,jTREND_INDIRECT_PWt + α4,i,c,jTREND_DIRECT_PWi,c,j,t) is .09 
after 13 weeks since the beginning of the direct price war (when TREND_DIRECT_PWi,c,j,t 
= 13), and is not significantly different from zero after one year of the direct price war.47 
                                                        
 
47 We assume that the focal brand was included in the direct price war after 20 weeks since the first wave of price 
reductions (20 weeks represent the median for brands that did not enter the price war immediately, see also Figure 
3.6).  
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Table 3.8. Average effect of the indirect and direct price war on sales 
 
 
Weighted 
Average 
Normalized 
Effect 
Meta z   Meta 
p* 
Total indirect effect over time 
(α1,i,c,j +  
α2,i,c,j* TREND_INDIRECT_PWt)'              
TREND_INDIRECT_PWt = 13 -0.40 -3.96 <0.01 
TREND_INDIRECT_PWt = 52 -1.05 -10.17 <0.01 
Total direct effect over time  
(α1i,c,j + α2,i,c,j +  
α3,i,c,j TREND_INDIRECT_PWt+ 
α4,i,c,jTREND_DIRECT_ PWi,c,j,t)' 
TREND_INDIRECT_PWt = 20    
TREND_DIRECT_ PWi,c,j,t = 13 0.09 1.31  0.10 
TREND_DIRECT_ PWi,c,j,t= 52 -0.01 -0.09  >0.10 
Note: (α1,i,c,j + α3,i,c,j* TREND_INDIRECT_PWt)'  and (α1,i,c,j + α2,i,c,j + α3,i,c,j TREND_INDIRECT_PWt 
+ α4,i,c,jTREND_DIRECT_ PWi,c,j,t)' refer to the normalized effects of (α1i,c,j + α3,i,c,j* TREND_INDIRECT_PWt)  
and (α1,i,c,j + α2,i,c,j + α3i,c,j TREND_INDIRECT_PWt + α4,i,c,jTREND_DIRECT_ PWi,c,j,t), respectively. 
 
Panel A of Figure 3.7 illustrates the evolution of the indirect price-war effect on 
sales (in %), while the resulting total direct price-war effect is shown in panel B of the 
same figure. In panel B of Figure 3.7, we assume that the focal brand was directly included 
in the price war after 20 weeks (in week 167). The total direct effect becomes insignificant 
in week 181 (p > .10), so the positive effect generated by the direct price war disappears 
after 14 weeks.48  (Note that almost 30% of the brands in our dataset did not enter the price 
war at all. In those cases, the evolution of the price war on baseline sales is represented by 
the solid line in Panel A of Figure 3.7.) 
These results offer some first implications for manufacturers. First of all, the high 
number of negative indirect effects (see Table 3.6, column “Negative”), suggest that 
avoiding permanent price reductions during a price war does harm sales.  
Second, during a direct price-war scenario national brands seem to benefit from 
permanent price reductions. However, for 29% of the brands directly involved in the price 
war, we observe a reduction in sales. This may happen because when the price of a brand 
is reduced, its relative price changes, but it does not necessarily improve, as this depends 
on the prices of the competing brands in the category and on the fact that consumers may 
get used to the lower price level.  
                                                        
 
48 If we use a more conservative test (p < .01), the effect disappears, after nine weeks from the beginning of the 
direct price war (in week 29).  
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Third, both manufacturers and retailers should take into account that lowering the 
price of a focal brand leads to higher sales, but only for few months. As consumers update 
their reference price at the lower level (Helson 1964), sales return to the pre-price war 
level in 3 months. 
Fourth, it is interesting to notice that retailers that are perceived as cheaper, like 
Retailer 3 (see Figure 3.2), experience both strong positive indirect and direct effects. 
Already aware of the store’s lower prices, consumers increase purchases, even for those 
products whose prices have not been reduced. 
3.7.2. Are promotions more or less often effective during a price war? 
To look at the impact of the price war on sales promotions, we first observe the 
sign of the normalized total effects TE* i,c,j,p, obtained from E7, with particular attention to 
the three scenarios the brand can face, either (1) a business-as-usual scenario (before the 
price war), (2) an indirect price-war scenario, or (3) a direct price-war scenario.49 To these 
three, we add a general “overall” price-war scenario, obtained by analyzing all the TE* i,c,j,p 
of promotions implemented during the price war, with no difference between indirect or 
direct price wars. Table 3.9 reports the percentage of the positive TE*i,c,j,p in these different 
environments, while Table 3.10 shows whether the percentages displayed in Table 3.9 are 
significantly different across the four scenarios, based on proportion tests. We find a 
similar percentage of significant promotion events (p < .05) before the price war (80%) as 
well as during the price war (84%) (Table 3.9). The proportion test reported in Table 3.10 
confirms that there is no difference between these percentages. Moreover, during the price 
war, when the price of the focal brand has not been directly reduced (indirect price war), 
89% of the promotions are significant. Similarly, when the price is reduced (direct price 
war), we find that 82% of the promotion events are significantly able to lift up sales. 
Again, the proportion test indicates no difference between the percentage of the positive 
direct effects and the positive indirect effects (two-proportion z-test: z-value = -1.21, p = 
.23).  
 
                                                        
 
49 Remember that each TE* i,c,j,p corresponds to an individual promotion event p. Therefore, we can easily identify 
when the promotion was implemented, as specified in E7. 
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Table 3.9. Percentage of significant positive promotion events (p < .05) 
 Positive effects 
 Before the price war During the price war Indirect price war Direct price war 
Total 80% 84% 89% 82% 
Retailer 1  82 % (N = 119) 
93% 
(N = 70) 
100% 
(N = 13) 
96% 
(N = 57) 
Retailer 2  95% (N = 97) 
83% 
(N = 57) 
72% 
(N = 17) 
88% 
(N = 40) 
Retailer 3  71% (N = 66) 
74% 
(N = 85) 
88% 
(N = 19) 
73% 
(N = 66) 
Retailer 4  82% (N = 92) 
81% 
(N = 91) 
95% 
(N = 22) 
73% 
(N = 69) 
N                   374 303 71 232 
Table 3.10. Proportion test of significant positive promotion events 
  
Positive effects 
  
Before vs. during  Before vs. indirect  Before vs. direct  Indirect vs. direct 
  Δ% z-value  Δ% z-value  Δ% z-value  Δ% z-value 
Total    -3.55%  -.90     -8.75%   -1.22     -1.96% -.51    - 7.02%  -1.20 
Retailer 1   -11.25%    -1.90**   -18.26% -1.35   -14.11%  -2.32*       3.64%  .09 
Retailer 2    12.08%    2.17*     23.42%   2.75*      7.54% 1.10    -15.72%   -1.19 
Retailer 3     -3.02%  -.11   -16.66% -1.11     -2.32%  -.08    15.03%    .93 
Retailer 4     1.09% .16   -12.95% -1.08     9.14% 1.20     21.55%      .73* 
* two-sided p-value < .05, ** two-sided p-value < .10 
 
 
Greater variability exists across retailers. For example, while at Retailer 1 we 
observe more often effective promotions during the price war than before the price war 
started (two-proportion z-test: z-value = 1.90, p = .057), at Retailer 2 we notice a decrease 
in the percentage of effective promotions (two-proportion z-test: z-value = -2.17, p < .05). 
In contrast, the price war did not affect the number of effective promotions implemented at 
Retailer 3 and Retailer 4.  
These findings indicate that, overall, the price war did not increase or decrease the 
number of effective promotions.  
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3.7.3. What is the size of the effect of a price war on sales promotions? 
Table 3.11 reports the results of the model described in equation E8. At first sight, 
these results may appear to contradict those described above. However, in the previous 
paragraph we focused on the number of effective promotions, making an abstraction of the 
magnitude of the effects, and we did not filter out important factors that could be at play. 
Here, instead, we look at the size of those effects, estimated in E8. Of central interest here 
are the gamma parameters, γ1 and (γ1 + γ2), representing, respectively, the instantaneous 
effects of the indirect and direct price wars on sales promotion effectiveness, followed by 
their evolution over time, (γ1 + γ3 TIME_LAG_INDIRECT_PW p ) and (γ1 + γ2 + γ3 
TIME_LAG_INDIRECT_PW p + γ 4 TIME_LAG_DIRECT_PW i,c,j,p. The Pseudo R2 is .42. 
The model does not present serious multicollinearity (all VIFs < 5).  
Although there are no differences before versus during the price war in terms of 
the number of effective promotions, the results of the regression analysis in E8 suggest that 
promotions are more effective at the beginning of the indirect price war than before (γ1 = 
1.14, p < .01), but that their effectiveness decreases as the price war continues (γ3 = -.03, p 
< .01; after 13 weeks, γ1 + γ3 13 = .70, p < .05; after one year, γ1 + γ3 52 = -.63, p = .06). 
Then, when the product’s price has been reduced, sales promotions are even more effective 
than during the indirect price war (γ2 = .15, p < .05) and/or before the price war (γ1 + γ2 = 
1.29, p < .01). However, this positive direct effect is only temporary and decreases over 
time (γ4 = .02, p < .0001; for TIME_LAG_INDIRECT_PWp = 20, when TIME_LAG_ 
DIRECT_PW i,c,j,p = 13, γ1 + γ2 + γ3 20 + γ4 13 = .37, p < .05; when 
TIME_LAG_DIRECT_PW i,c,j,p = 52, γ1 + γ2 + γ3 20 + γ4 52 = -.32, p >.10), as also 
illustrated in Figure 3.7, panel C and D.50 Panel C of Figure 3.7 shows the evolution of the 
effect of the indirect price war, while Panel D of Figure 3.10 displays the total price-war 
impact on promotional effectiveness over time, assuming a duration of the indirect price 
war of 20 weeks (based on the median of our sample). During both the indirect and direct 
price war, the promotional effectiveness first increases (immediate effect) and then 
decreases over time. The positive effects generated by the price war vanish after a few 
                                                        
 
50 As mentioned above, one could instead capture the evolution of the price war over time by means of the 
number of items involved in the price war, as in van Heerde et al. (2008). Not having the necessary information at 
hand, we use two linear trends instead.  We also tested non-linear alternatives (1) by adding a quadratic term (γ5 
TIME_LAG_INDIRECT_PWp 2;γ6 TIME_LAG_ DIRECT_PWi,c,j,p 2), and (2) by using two inverted trends (instead 
of the trends) (γ 3’ 1/TIME_LAG_ INDIRECT_PWp ; γ 4’ 1/TIME_LAG_ DIRECT_PWi,c,j,p). The resulting 
parameters are not significant.  
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months for both the indirect and direct price-war scenario, as promotional effectiveness 
drop below the business-as-usual scenario level.  
Further variation in the effectiveness of sales promotions is captured by a set of 
control variables related to the way each promotion was implemented (deal planning and 
deal communication) and other covariates. The results are displayed in Table 3.10 and 
discussed below. 
Deal planning. Timing. In line with our previous findings (see Chapter 2), our 
results indicate that promotions are more effective when more time elapses between two 
consecutive events, not only when implemented at the same retailer but also at competing 
retailers (ξ1 = 1.21, p < .0001, ξ2 = .83, p < .005 ). The simultaneous occurrence of a 
promotion at a competing retailer (during the same week) is not significant, although the 
negative sign is in line with our previous findings.  
Depth. Another important driver of price promotion effectiveness is the depth of 
the discount. In line with the extant literature, we find that larger discounts work better 
than smaller discounts (e.g. Blattberg et al. 1995) (ξ4 = .94, p = .01). 
Duration. Consistent with our prior findings (see Chapter 2), shorter promotion 
events work better than longer ones (ξ5 = -1.22, p < .05).  
Deal communication. Out-of-store feature communication (ξ6 = 1.20, p < .0001) 
as well as in-store displays (ξ7 = 1.44, p = .001) increase sales, in line with the results 
discussed in Chapter 2 and the literature on sales promotion (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2004). 
The cumulative effects of advertising expenditure do not significantly influence price 
promotion effectiveness.  
Other control variables. In line with previous research, we find that a higher 
concentration in the product category leads to higher effectiveness of sales promotions (ξ10 
= 2.72, p < .10) (e.g. Bell et al. 1999). We report no differences across categories,51 but 
strong variation across retailers, with less effective promotions implemented at Retailer 2, 
Retailer 3 and Retailer 4 than at Retailer 1.  
                                                        
 
51 The full results, including the category fixed-effects, can be found in Appendix A2. 
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Figure 3.7. Evolution of the indirect and direct price war (assuming that the indirect 
price-war scenario starts in week 147 – panel A, B, C, D – and lasts for 20 weeks – 
panel B, C –) 
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Table 3.11. Moderator analysis 
  Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value Two-sided 
p-value 
 μ1 INTERCEPT 4.218 1.42 0.156 
 μ2 DR2 -2.073 -2.45 0.015 
 μ3 DR3 -2.012 -2.24 0.025 
 μ4 DR4 -1.741 -1.85 0.065 
PRICE WAR    
 γ1 INDIRECT_PW 1.142 3.11 0.002 
 γ2 DIRECT_PW 0.153 1.93 0.054 
 γ3 TIME_LAG_ INDIRECT_PW  -0.034 -2.25 0.001 
 γ4 TIME_LAG_DIRECT_ PW 0.015 3.73 <.0001 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
   
PLANNING 
      
ξ1 Log TIMING 1.213 3.98 <.0001 
 ξ2 Log TIMING_COMP  0.832 2.99 0.002 
 ξ3 SIMULTANEOUS  -0.783 -1.27 0.204 
 ξ4 Log DEPTH 0.945 2.54 0.011 
 ξ5 Log DURATION -1.219 -1.99 0.047 
COMMUNICATION (vs. in-store shelf tag) 
      
 ξ6 FEATURE 1.195 4.77 <.0001 
 ξ7 DISPLAY 1.436 3.18 0.001 
 ξ8 Log ADSTOCK -0.071 -0.82 0.412 
OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES 
      
 ξ9 Log MKTSHARE 0.671 0.44 0.660 
 ξ10 Log CONCENTRATION 2.719 1.97 0.049 
 
N = 657 
Pseudo R2 = .42    
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3.7.3.1. Impact on the drivers of sales promotions 
Additionally, we check whether there was a change in the effectiveness of each 
promotion implementation variable (i.e. TIMING, TIMING_COMP, SIMULTANEOUS, 
DEPTH, FEATURE and DISPLAY) during the price war. To do so, we extend equation E8 
with the interactions of these variables with the indirect and direct price wars. For 
example, with regard to the timing, the model is augmented in the following 
way: ξ1INDIRECT TIMINGi,c,j,p * INDIRECT_PWp + ξ1DIRECT TIMINGi,c,j,p * 
DIRECT_PWi,c,j,p. As a result, below we focus the attention on the parameter related to the 
indirect effects, i.e. ξ1INDIRECT, and the direct effects, i.e. (ξ1INDIRECT +ξ1DIRECT). In order to 
avoid high multicollinearity, we do not test all the variables simultaneously, but we add the 
four interactions for one variable at a time.  
We find evidence of a significant change in some of these drivers during the price 
war. More specifically, promotions implemented after a longer interval of time at the focal 
retailer (ξ1INDIRECT = -.97, p < .01; ξ1INDIRECT +ξ1DIRECT = .15, p = .11) and at a competing 
retailer (ξ2INDIRECT = -.58, p < .01; ξ2INDIRECT +ξ2DIRECT = .33, p = .18) are less effective than 
before the price war. We find this effect during the indirect price war, suggesting that when 
the manufacturer’s brand has a higher relative price, more frequent promotions than those 
implemented during a business-as-usual scenario are needed to keep the brand competitive.  
A greater depth of discount works better during the indirect price war (ξ4INDIRECT = 
.38, p < .01), suggesting once again that manufacturers’ brands facing an indirect price war 
need more resources (in this case, steeper discounts) to remain attractive. Instead, brands 
with a reduced price (facing a direct price war) are able to stimulate the same level of sales 
as they did before the price war.  
Feature communication is more effective during both the direct and indirect price 
wars (ξ6INDIRECT = .41, p < .01; ξ6INDIRECT +ξ6DIRECT = .52, p < .01). Indeed, as we said 
above, features become an essential tool for retailers to communicate their competitive 
offers and for consumers to decide where and what to buy.  
The increased usage of displays inside the store, for both price discounts and 
permanent price reductions, creates a saturation effect and lowers the effectiveness of 
display communication. We find evidence of this during the direct price war (ξ7INDIRECT = 
.97, p = .23; ξ7INDIRECT +ξ7DIRECT = -1.24, p < .001). 
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3.8. Conclusions  
Price wars are often described as a sequence of battles to win the customer using 
permanent lower prices as the key weapon. When a price war is initiated, both retailers and 
manufacturers have two main options: lower their prices or not. Even when lowering 
his/her prices, a retailer may decide not to involve all the products in a given category and 
a manufacturer’s brand may end up in an indirect price war. Although Rao et al. (2000) 
suggest managers to avoid direct price wars and the use of price reductions during price 
wars, to the best of our knowledge, this advice has not yet been empirically tested. It is in 
fact difficult for managers to follow this type of recommendation, as they are afraid of 
losing sales if they do not reduce the prices when their competitors do so. Indeed, we find 
that avoiding permanent price reductions might be counterproductive, since sales tend to 
immediately decrease by 17%, on average (Table 3.6). A relative price deterioration thus 
harms sales, and brand managers should be advised to join the direct price war as quickly 
as possible.  
In fact, when the brand’s price is reduced, sales increase by 48% (in comparison 
with their level before the price war) (Table 3.7). Managers should view this information 
with caution for two reasons. First of all, this positive effect is only temporary and wears 
off after a couple of months. Second, they should also notice that, for 29% of the brands 
involved directly in the price waves, there is a drop in sales. In fact, reducing the absolute 
price may not be enough if there is no significant improvement in the relative 
attractiveness of the focal brand’s price (i.e. in the relative price of the brand vis-à-vis its 
competitors).  
Before manufacturers decide to (or not to) try to convince retailers to permanently 
reduce the price of their products (e.g. by means of lower trade prices and trade 
promotions), they must also consider the impact of the price war on their promotional 
activities. During an indirect price war, sales promotions increase their effectiveness for 
the first seven months. In this scenario, manufacturers need to offer more sales promotions 
(i.e. by reducing the inter-promotion timing), with steeper discounts and with feature 
communication support. Instead, if the manufacturer decides to reduce the product’s price, 
he/she will observe more effective promotions, although also this effect wears off after five 
months since the price of the product has been lowered. In this environment, 
manufacturers can keep the same timing and depth of the discount they used to implement 
before the price war, as their effectiveness does not change. They should communicate 
promotions even more by means of features, as consumers select where and what to buy 
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based on the store flyers. Finally, they must keep in mind that displays are less effective 
than before the price war (due to the cluttered in-store environment now displaying also 
permanent price reductions).  
Table 3.12. Summary of the results 
Note: This table is based on the results discussed on page 84-85, 88-94. 
 
 
Future research could investigate in more detail the impact of the decisions of the 
competitors to decrease their prices on the sales of the focal manufacturer. For example, 
manufacturers’ sales and promotion activities may be affected to a different degree if only 
one of the competitors reduces the price, or if several big players lower their prices within 
the category. This could be captured by adding to both the first and the second step of the 
analysis an interaction between the indirect price war dummy variable and the cumulative 
number of SKUs of the competing brands involved in the price reductions. Alternatively, 
to capture the attraction power of these brands, instead of the cumulative number of 
competing SKUs, one could use the sum of the market shares of the competing brands 
involved.  
We also want to point out that we consider the effects on sales and not on profit. 
This is not uncommon in the promotional literature, as margin data are very rarely 
available. We could expect a different (if not opposite) picture when margins are 
considered. For example, will the incremental lift in sales be able to compensate for the 
lower margin? Future research could address this question and focus on the impact of the 
price war on the profitability of sales promotions.  
 
 
 
Indirect price war  
If the brand’s price has not been reduced 
 
 
Direct price war 
If the brand’s price has been reduced 
 
Brand sales Lower sales ≤ 3 months: Higher sales 
Brand’s 
promotional 
effectiveness 
≤ 7 months: Higher promotional 
effectiveness 
≤ 5 months: Higher promotional 
effectiveness 
Drivers of 
promotional 
effectiveness 
Decreased effectiveness of timing  
Increased effectiveness of discount depth  
Increased effectiveness of features 
Increased effect. of features 
Lower effectiveness of displays 
Sales promotions during a price war 
73 
To conclude, despite the limitations of this study, our chapter makes an important 
step in documenting the impact of price wars on sales promotion. Every year, 
manufacturers spend billions on price promotions and yet, despite the increasing number 
of price wars, no study so far has investigated the consequences of price wars for 
promotional effectiveness. We hope this study will stimulate further research in this 
direction.  
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CHAPTER 4: CROSS-RETAILER EFFECTS 
4.1. Introduction 
While there has been considerable research on the decomposition of the 
promotional sales bump into cross-brand effects, cross-period effects, and category-
expansion effects (see e.g. Bell et al. 1999, van Heerde et al. 2004), limited attempts have 
been made to investigate cross-store effects. However, sales promotions can also transfer 
demand across competing chains (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). For instance, Ailawadi et al. 
(2006: 531) suggest that a large part of the gross lift generated by sales promotions at CVS 
may be due to store switching behavior. They state that “45% of the gross lift is 
incremental, coming either from other stores or from increased consumption. Because the 
latter is likely to be small for most of these mature product categories, store switching 
must be a significant phenomenon, and it deserves further investigation.” 
Because manufacturers sell their goods through competing retailers, these demand 
shifts across chains may reduce the overall effect of manufacturers’ sales promotions. Yet, 
there is little empirical knowledge neither about the size of these cross-chain effects, nor 
about their impact on the overall effectiveness of sales promotions for manufacturers.  
Previous research has often focused on the effect of promotions in a single 
store/chain. For example, several studies have used the Dominick’s data (see e.g. 
Srinivasan et al. 2004), while Ailawadi et al. (2006) focused on the effectiveness of price 
promotions at CVS. However, there is increasing evidence that many customers are 
multiple-store shoppers (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). This is also emphasized in the literature 
on cherry-picking behavior, describing the characteristics of shoppers who shop around for 
the best deals across several stores. Fox and Hoch (2005), for example, find that more than 
80% of the households in their sample cherry-picked. First attempts to measure cross-chain 
effects have been done by van Heerde et al. (2004). The authors argue that the cross-store 
effect may account for most of the category-expansion effect. Unfortunately, these results 
were significant in only 25% of the cases, and for a dataset limited to four brands of tuna.  
A manufacturer, in order to identify possible solutions, should also know if these 
cross-store effects are homogeneous across competing stores, or if some retailers are less 
(or more) affected. Previous studies find greater rivalry within store formats than between 
store formats (Cleeren et al. 2010, González-Benito et al. 2005), suggesting higher 
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cannibalization among chains sharing similar characteristics. Identifying who suffers more 
will help the manufacturer to develop strategies to contain the problem and avoid channel 
conflict. 
In Chapter 2, we found preliminary evidence for the existence of these cross-store 
effects, where we show that the timing since the last promotion with a competing retailer, 
as well as the simultaneous promotions of competing retailers, diminish the effectiveness 
of the current promotion event at the focal retailer.  
In this chapter, we directly model and quantify the impact of cross-chain effects. 
In particular, we are interested answering the following questions: (1) How often do these 
cross-effects occur?, (2) What is the effect size?, and (3) To what extent is the effect 
homogeneous across stores? 
4.2. Model 
To investigate the effectiveness of individual price-promotion events across 
competing retailers, we expand the model specification presented in E3 in the following 
way. We explain the sales of each product i at retailer j (with j = 1 to J) as a function of its 
own promotions p, and the promotion events p’ of the market leader ml (with ml ≠ j). In 
particular, we are interested in measuring the individual effects of the promotions 
(PROMOML) of the market leader ml, on the sales of the competing retailers j. Moreover, 
we control for the average effect of other competing promotions (CP) at retailers j’ (with j 
≠ j’, ml ≠ j’). The model is: 
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The equation E9 is estimated for each product i across all retailers j 
simultaneously using iterative SUR-GLS with Prais–Winsten correction to obtain more 
efficient parameter estimates (Judge et al. 1985). The error term has the following 
distribution: 
εi,c,j,t = ρ i,c,j εi,c,j,t-1 + υi,c,j,t 
εi,c,j’,t = ρ i,c,’ εi,c,j’,t-1 + υi,c,j’,t 
cov [υi,c,j,t , υi,c,j’,t] = σi,c,j,j’  
 
where υi,c,j,t ~                         and υi,c,j’,t ~                         . 
The cross-retailer effect (CE) of each promotion p’ implemented by retailer ml, 
the market leader, on the sales of retailer j for brand i is therefore: 
 
(E10)   CE i,c,j,p’ =       i,c,j,p’,l 
 
Next, we test whether the focal retailer is stealing more customers away from 
retailers with a similar format, or whether this effect is the same across all competing 
retailers. To do this, we regress the normalized cross-store effect, CE*, on the dummy 
variables for the different retailers (in our case, Retailer 3, Retailer 4, using Retailer 2 as 
reference group) in a WLS model, using as weight the inverse of the standard error of CE*.  
 
(E11)   CE*i,c,j,p’ = β 1  + β 2 Retailer 3 + β 3 Retailer 4 + ε i,c,j,p’ 
 
 CE*i,c,j,p’ was computed by normalizing CEi,c,j,p’ by dividing it by the baseline 
sales of brand i (of category c) at retailer j (the baseline sales are measured as the average 
non-promotional sales of each brand within rival retailer j; when computing the average, 
we excluded the weeks when either the market leader ml or retailer j carried a promotion of 
brand i, and the two weeks following the event, to account for post-promotion effects). 
Finally, the total sales shift generated by each promotion p’ of retailer ml across 
all the competing retailers is captured by the normalized total cross-retailer effect (TCE*) 
as follows: 
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(E12)  TCE*i,c,p’ =                    /                                                   with j ≠ j’ 
 
whereby for a given promotion of a focal product i, we divide the sum of each CE 
generated across all the retailers j, by the sum of the baselines of those retailers j. The 
standard errors of CE* and TCE* are derived through the Delta method (Greene 2003). 
4.3. Data 
We use a subset of the database used in Chapter 2. We select products with a 
limited numbers of promotion events (≤ 4), to allow us to identify the own- and cross-store 
effect of each individual promotion, together with its lags. The final dataset covers a time 
span of 147 weeks, with a total of 32 promotions of Retailer 1 for 12 brands of a leading 
multinational CPG manufacturer, across four product categories. In particular, we focus on 
the effects of the promotions of the market leader, Retailer 1, on the sales of three retailers, 
Retailers 2, 3 and 4. We measure a total of 96 effects (i.e. the effects of 32 promotions of 
the market leader at three retailers). 
These promotions varied greatly in terms of the timing since the previous one 
implemented at Retailer 1 (M = 45.51, SD = 42.94) and at Retailer 2, 3 and 4 (MRetailer2 = 
8.25, SDRetailer2 = 3.77; MRetailer3 = 18.25, SDRetailer3 = 16.46; MRetailer4 = 40.75, SDRetailer4 = 
16.78).52 There were no simultaneous promotions of Retailer 2, Retailer 3 and Retailer 4 
taking place. Moreover, all the deals lasted for only one week, with an average percentage 
of the discount of 19% (M = 19.21, SD = 6.49). Most of the promotions implemented at 
Retailer 1 were supported by feature communication (in 82% of the cases), and only very 
few were accompanied by an in-store display (in 12% of the cases) (Table 4.1). Table 4.1 
provides an overview of the main descriptive statistics of the promotions implemented at 
Retailer 1. 
                                                        
 
52 These means refer to the average number of weeks between a promotion implemented at Retailer 1  and the 
previous promotion implemented at, respectively, Retailer 1 (TIMING), Retailer 2 (TIMING_ RETAILER2), 
Retailer 3 (TIMING_RETAILER3), and Retailer 4 (TIMING_RETAILER4). 
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4.4. Results 
To analyze the cross-store effects, we look at the sign of the cross-store effects, 
CE, estimated in E10. A negative sign would confirm the existence of cross-store 
cannibalization effects. Figure 4.1 illustrates the percentage of the signs of these effects. 
We find that 86% of the promotion events of the market leader, Retailer 1, reduces the sales 
of its competing retailers, although in only 24% of the cases this reduction is significant (two-
sided p-value < .05)53 (see Figure 4.1).  
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of the promotions implemented at Retailer 1 
 M (SD) 
PLANNING  
TIMING_RETAILER1 (weeks) 45.51 (42.94) 
TIMING_ RETAILER2 (weeks) 8.25 (3.77) 
TIMING_ RETAILER3 (weeks) 18.25 (16.46) 
TIMING_ RETAILER4 (weeks) 40.75 (16.78) 
SIMULTANEOUS (frequency %)* 0 
DEPTH (%) 19. 21 (6.49) 
DURATION (weeks) 1.00 (.00) 
COMMUNICATION   
FEATURE (frequency %)* 81.25 
DISPLAY (frequency %)* 12.50 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS  
Number of promotions 32 
Number of weeks 147 
*For the dummy variables, we report the frequency (%). 
 
 
Subsequently, we test whether Retailer 1 is stealing more customers away from a 
similar retailers’ format, like Retailer 4, or whether this effect is the same across all three 
retailers. The results of the WLS regression (E11) suggest that there is a main effect of the 
retailer format on the normalized cross-store effects CE*. When promoting at Retailer 1, 
the manufacturer is cannibalizing his/her own sales at Retailer 3 (β1 + β2 = -.19, p < .01) 
                                                        
 
53 The percentage of significant cross-effects increases to 31% when we consider a two-sided p-value < .10, and 
to 39% when we consider a one-sided p-value < .10. 
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and Retailer 4 (β1 + β3 = -.22, p < .01), but not at Retailer 2 (β1 = .05, p = .19).54 Looking 
at the perceptual map of Figure 2.3, we notice that in the mind of the consumers Retailers 
2 is far from Retailer 1 in terms of prices and service quality. Retailer 3 and 4, instead, are 
characterized a medium level of prices and service quality, and are positioned between 
Retailer 1 and Retailer 2. Our findings suggest that chains like Retailer 2, with a different 
store format from the focal retailer (“low price, low service” vs. “high price, high 
service”), face lower direct competition than retailers with a less dissimilar store profile.  
Finally, from the results of E10 (Figure 4.1) we notice that the individual impact 
of the promotion of Retailer 1 on the sales of the focal brand in each of the competing 
retailers (CE) tends to be weak (two-sided p-value > .20 in 62% of the cases) but in the 
same direction (negative). This highlights that a case-by-case test may be misleading, and 
unable to detect any significant cannibalization effect to worry about (Deleersnyder et al. 
2002). Instead, the collective evidence could reveal a highly significant cannibalization 
effect that manufacturers should monitor. Therefore, we conduct a meta-analysis to test for 
cross-store cannibalization using the Stouffer’s meta-analytic test of “adding zs” (see 
Rosenthal 1991: 97 for technical details, or Gijsbrechts et al. 2003 and Deleersnyder et al. 
2002 for some marketing applications). As discussed by Deleersnyder et al. (2002), this 
offers a stronger test for the presence of cannibalization than the significance of the 
individual estimates. The results of the meta-analysis confirm that the overall effect is 
negative and significant (meta-analytic effect size = -.12, p < .01).  
Moreover, if we look at the (normalized) sum of these effects, TCE* (obtained in 
E12), we notice that a single promotion event is shifting a significant amount of traffic 
toward the focal chain. In fact, as displayed in Figure 4.3, the sum of the cross-store effects 
is negative for 93% of the promotions (and significant in 77% of the cases). This relevant 
effect may go unnoticed when the manufacturer collects the sales information from each 
retailer separately.  
 
 
 
                                                        
 
54 We report no difference between β2 and β3 (p >.10).  
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Figure 4.1. Percentage of (not) significant CE (cross effects of the sales promotions 
implemented at Retailer 1 on competing retailers)(two-sided p-value < .05) 
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Figure 4.2. Percentage of (not) significant TCE* (normalized total cross effects of 
promotions implemented at Retailer 1 on competing retailers) 
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4.5. Conclusions 
When dealing with sales promotion effectiveness, cross-chain effects have largely 
been ignored in previous research. However, more and more scholars have pointed out that 
these effects could be substantial (Ailawadi et al. 2006). Our results shed some light in this 
direction.  
We find that a sales promotion event at a focal retailer shifts a small amount of 
customers away from another competing chain. If the point of view of the analysis is that 
of the retailer, then this effect may not be noticed. In fact, we find that a retailer does not 
observe a significant decrease in sales due to a competing promotion event in 74% of the 
cases.  
However, if the point of view is that of the manufacturer selling through 
competing retailers, the picture is changing dramatically. In fact, the sum of these shifts in 
sales across the competing retailers is significant for almost 80% of the promotions, 
suggesting that the manufacturer is mainly shifting traffic toward the focal retailer. This 
cannibalization effect is not visible when manufacturers look at the sales of each individual 
chain. To monitor it, the manufacturer should analyze the results of his/her sales 
promotions across all competing chains.  
Moreover, our result suggests that the promotions of the manufacturer’s brand at a 
“high-price, high-service” retailer, do not induce consumers of a different format (“low-
price, low-service”) to switch stores. The promotional literature (Blattberg and Wisniewski 
1989, Bronnenberg and Wathieu 1996) indicates that when a high quality national brand 
promotes, it steals away more customers from the lower quality brands than vice versa. Here 
we find the opposite effect between stores. Our result is in line with previous studies 
showing lower rivalry between different store formats (González-Benito et al. 2005). This 
may be due to the type of consumers that the different store formats attract. Lower price 
retailers are preferred by large basket shoppers (Bell and Lattin 1998). These consumers 
may not be easily lured to switch store because of a single promotion event (as they search 
for the lower prices of a set of products).  
Our study has several limitations, as we look at the promotion events of the 
leading retailer, for products of only one manufacturer. Also, the analysis is confined to 
FMCG, and for goods of a unitary value of less than 10 euro. We can expect that a lower 
unitary value may induce lower store switching. Instead, a higher unitary price could also 
induce shoppers of a “low-price, low-service” retailer to switch. For example, the effect 
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may be even stronger for durable goods. It would be thus interesting to verify these 
findings across different manufacturers, retailers and industries. Additionally, future 
research should identify the drivers of these cross-store effects, and provide guidelines for 
manufacturers on how to limit (if not avoid) these effects. Moreover, in this study, we 
focus on brands with limited promotional activity. As we found in Chapter 2 that less 
frequent promotions are the most effective, this may lead to a sample selection bias. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. What have we learned? 
Every year manufacturers and retailers alike spend a substantial amount of their 
marketing budget on sales promotions. As such, it is not surprising that many scholars 
have focused on the topic. Managing national brands’ promotions across competing 
retailers is a complex task in today’s competitive market. A brand manager must decide 
which type of promotion to implement and when, accounting for the effects generated by 
each promotion event (1) during stable business-as-usual scenarios as well as (2) during 
price wars, not only at the focal retailer, but also (3) at competing retailers. 
Previous research has mainly focused on the first aspect, investigating sales 
promotion variation across products and retailers, providing brand managers with a clear 
understanding of which brand sells more on promotion, and at which retailer. However, for 
a specific brand, they still cannot identify how many promotions are truly able to lift up 
sales. Still, managers are well aware of the fact that some of their promotions work better 
than others.  
Therefore, we built on the extant literature, and we extended it in three directions. 
In Chapter 2, we introduced a new methodological approach based on Leone’s (1987) 
intervention analysis. This method allowed us to identify in a flexible way the effect of 
individual promotion events, finally understanding how many promotions are truly 
effective. This was not possible with models based on an average promotional parameter. 
In an “average” approach, as with the SCAN*PRO model, the researcher computes one 
average coefficient across several promotion events, not allowing the scholar to identify 
the number of effective promotions. 
Also, our approach allowed us to use promotion event-specific (dependent and 
independent) variables, rather than averages computed across different promotion 
implementations. For example, we did not use an average frequency computed across 
different promotions of the same brand, but the individual timing since the previous 
promotion event. This more refined approach provides detailed insights into what works 
and what does not. 
In Chapter 3, using the method discussed in Chapter 2, we compared the 
effectiveness of sales promotions in a business-as-usual scenario versus a price war 
Chapter 5  
86 
environment. The price war studied in this dissertation is the one initiated in the 
Netherlands in 2003 by the leading supermarket chain. We added to both the promotional 
literature and the price war literature by focusing not on the consequences of the initiator 
of the price war, nor of the main actors involved directly in the price interactions (as 
commonly done so far), but of a third party. In our setting, this third party is the brand 
manufacturer, who has to sell his/her products through a channel involved in a price war. 
In particular, we showed what happens to the regular and promotional sales of a national 
manufacturer’s brands. In so doing, we looked at two different scenarios within the price 
war: an indirect and a direct price war. If the manufacturer’s brand is (not) directly 
involved in the price reductions characterizing the price war, then the brand faces a 
(in)direct price war. The consequences for its regular and promotional sales are different. 
This can be attributed to the differential changes in the brand’s relative price. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, we focused on the effects of sales promotions not only 
within the focal retailer but also at competing chains, largely understudied by the 
promotional literature. In fact, although the cherry-picking literature had established that a 
segment in the consumer market only buys items on promotions, and thus bases its store 
choice on the occurrence of price promotions, limited research has investigated the impact 
of promotions on competing store chains. From the perspective of the manufacturer, for a 
promotion to be successful, a promotion must be able to lift up total sales, even after 
accounting for potential reductions in competing stores. In Chapter 4, we tried to capture 
these potential cannibalization effects. 
5.2. Summary of the main findings 
Overall, we systematically analyzed the effects of a total of 832 promotions in 
eight different product categories, using a maximum of five years of weekly data and a 
wide set of marketing mix variables. We found that: 
(1) From the perspective of the manufacturer, around 80% of the promotions are 
truly able to lift the brand sales significantly within the focal chain.  
(2) In comparison with an “average-effect” model, like a log-log model, we gain 
a more detailed overview of what really works and what does not. For 
instance: 
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(a) A non significant parameter of the log-log model indicates that the 
promotional activities of that brand are not able to lift sales. With our 
approach, instead, we are able to identify that almost 40% of those 
promotions are actually effective, and may result in a missed 
opportunity if the manufacturers decide to abandon them.  
(b) Instead, 13% of the promotional events of brands for which the log-log 
model indicates significant promotions are spoiled arms, as they are not 
able to significantly increase sales.  
(c) Only for 17% of the brands are all promotions able to boost sales.  
(3) When disentangling the total price war effect into an indirect price-war and a 
direct price-war effect, we observed that: 
(a) During an indirect price war, sales decrease. Manufacturers may be 
better off reducing their prices immediately. (Of course, more research 
is needed to assess the profitability implications). 
(b) When the focal brand is involved in the direct price war, sales increase. 
However, before taking action, brand managers should consider the 
following findings as well:  
(i) This positive effect is only temporary, as it returns to a business-
as-usual scenario level after few months. 
(ii) For almost 30% of the brands facing a direct price war, sales are 
lower than the business-as-usual scenario. Indeed, a lower price 
may not guarantee a significant improvement in the relative 
attractiveness of the focal brand vis-à-vis its competitors.  
(4) We could identify how many promotions are effective during a business-as-
usual scenario versus a price war environment. We found that: 
(a) The proportion of promotions able to lift up sales is not different during 
a price war.  
(b) The magnitude of the effects is higher during both the indirect and 
direct price war. These effects decline over time, disappearing after few 
months.  
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(c) More detailed data at the promotion level, instead of at the brand or 
category level, help us understand whether the implementations of sales 
promotions (deal timing within the focal chain, deal timing at 
competing chains, deal depth, features and displays) and their 
effectiveness change during different competitive settings.  
(d) Two understudied variables related to the promotional calendar of the 
focal chain and of the competing retailers are found to be important 
drivers of promotional effectiveness. In particular, we find that 
promotions implemented long after previous events within the focal 
retailer and/or at a competing chain are more effective. 
(e) During the price war, we see a clear change in the implementations of 
these drivers, with an overall decrease in the frequency of sales 
promotions and in the implementation of simultaneous promotions at 
competing retailers. Promotions also last longer, and are more often 
supported by means of features and displays than before the price war.  
(f) The price war changes the effectiveness of sales promotion 
implementation tools. When the price of the focal brand is not reduced, 
the brand manager should avoid leaving several weeks between two 
consecutive promotions (as suggested by the results obtained during the 
business-as-usual scenario) and instead implement more frequent 
promotions, with deeper discounts and supported by feature 
communications. In fact, given the disadvantageous relative price 
image, the brand needs more support to generate the same level of sales 
on promotion.  
(g) When the brand’s price has been directly reduced during the direct 
price war, displays become less effective while features increase their 
importance in stimulating sales. During a price war, consumers in fact 
tend to decide what to buy based on price, and a feature ad facilitates 
their selection. Although for this reason one could expect an increase 
also in the importance of display communication, the over-usage of in-
store displays for both permanent and temporary price reductions 
seems to dilute their effectiveness. As the price war continues and more 
competing brands are also reduced in price, steeper discounts are then 
needed.  
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(5) For each promotion we were able to estimate the impact on sales not only 
within the focal retailer but also at the competing retailers. We found 
significant evidence of cross-chain effects. We investigated the potential 
cannibalization of the promotion events of a brand implemented within the 
leading retailer on the sales of the main rival chains. Our results suggested that:  
(a) While for brand manufacturers these effects may go unnoticed when 
looking at each individual chain, they become significant when looking 
at the total impact across rival chains.  
(b) The competing retailers with a similar store format are negatively 
affected by the promotion events organized by the manufacturer at a 
rival store. For example, the market leader, characterized by high prices 
and high service, is stealing more customers away from a competing 
chain also characterized by a high price and service level. 
(c) Signs of potential cannibalization were evident when looking at the 
drivers of sales promotions during a stable business environment, as 
well as during a price war. In both settings, the timing since a 
promotion implemented at a competing store, and the presence of 
simultaneous promotions have a significant impact on the effectiveness 
of the focal event.  
(i) During a business-as-usual scenario and during a direct price war, 
it is important for the manufacturer not to promote the brand 
simultaneously across rival stores, or shortly after the temporary 
discount implemented at a competing retailer.  
(ii) During an indirect price war, instead, promotions are more 
effective if they are implemented more frequently, shortly after 
the promotion at a competing chain.  
5.3. Limitations and directions for future research 
The following paragraphs outline possible research opportunities still under-
investigated in the domain of sales promotions. We first acknowledge some of the 
limitations of this thesis, and then we provide recommendations on how to extend the 
analysis of price promotion effectiveness (1) from price wars to recessions, (2) to 
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environments characterized by sophisticated private labels portfolios, and (3) to 
discounters.  
General limitations. In terms of the limitations, we use data from only one 
multinational manufacturer, in one country. Moreover, the set of categories (e.g. bread 
replacements, biscuits and snack) analyzed represents only a subset of the categories found 
in supermarkets. The nature of the category may influence the willingness of consumers to 
travel to another store. The cross-chain effects may be even stronger for categories 
characterized by higher prices (e.g. diapers) or for traffic builders (e.g. colas). Future 
research is therefore needed to validate our results with datasets from different 
manufacturers, in different product categories and countries. Second, we use only volume 
sales information. Promotional effectiveness may change once we incorporate the costs 
related to the implementation of sales promotions (the costs of features and displays, etc.), 
or when explicitly accounting for the level of trade deals. Our work could therefore be 
extended to analyze the profit implications of sales promotions. Third, when looking at the 
impact of price wars, one could extend our work to incorporate alternative scenarios: (1) 
when a brand is facing a direct price war but the competing brands are not reduced in 
price, or (2) when a brand is facing an indirect price war together with all its competing 
brands (which we called a category indirect price war). These additional scenarios may 
alter the effectiveness of sales promotions in different ways from the ones discussed above.  
From price wars to recessions. Future studies could test whether the results 
presented in this dissertation hold in a recession scenario, given the high price sensitivity 
and competition characterizing both price wars and economic contractions. One important 
factor may however lead to other results: differently from a price war setting, in a 
recession, money is short for all the actors, i.e. manufacturers, retailers and consumers. In 
fact, during price wars, consumers’ discretionary income increases. During economic 
contractions, in contrast, it decreases, and consumers slow down their purchases and save 
where possible. This causes an increase in price sensitivity (Estelami et al. 2001), to which 
retailers as well as manufacturers react by proposing more price promotions to stimulate 
the demand (Lamey et al. 2008). As consumers reduce their purchases, it becomes more 
important for retailers and manufacturers to ensure that those sales still involve their 
stores/products. For example, Ma et al. (2010) show that households with lower incomes 
shop around more for deals during a recession. Thus, the competition among retailers and 
among manufacturers becomes fiercer. Managers modify their marketing strategy in 
response to recessions, although most companies indicate that they do not use any 
systematic procedure to determine the impact of such economic contraction on their 
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specific business (Shama 1993). In other words, managers feel the need to adapt their 
strategies to the new economic environment, but they do not know how exactly to assess 
the impact of recession on their marketing activities (Deleersnyder et al. 2009). Given the 
very elastic demand characterizing recessions, managers may have to rethink their pricing 
and promotional strategies. For example, should manufacturers and retailers decrease the 
regular price of their products, and/or implement more frequent and steeper sales 
promotion activities? How should they adapt their promotional activities? Should national 
brand manufacturer offer better trade deals to stimulate sales? Retailers may in fact push 
more private labels, as they offer lower prices for the consumers and higher margins for 
them (Ailawadi and Harlam 2004). Or, as both parties involved (manufacturers and 
retailers) have a strong interest in finding the right way to attract customers, are trade deals 
less needed? To answer these questions, future research should quantify the effects of 
recessions on sales and promotional effectiveness.  
Private labels. Especially if a price war is initiated by retailers, future research 
should look at the role played by private labels. As retailers have higher margins on store 
brands, they can more easily cut temporary and permanent prices of private labels to signal 
lower in-store prices, and to fight hard discounters (Ailawadi et al. 2008, Geyskens et al. 
2010). Indeed, during the Dutch price war, many price cut waves involved only private 
labels (see Table 3.2). Given the improved quality of the store brands and the strong 
presence of “premium” private labels in almost every product category, the (regular and 
promotional) sales of national brand manufacturers may be strongly influenced by the 
price of private labels.  
Manufacturers may want to know which private label tier is mining their market 
share and how to react to it. Geyskens et al. (2010) find that private labels are not always 
negatively influencing national brands’ sales, as the responses are asymmetric. The 
introduction of premium (economy) store brands may sometimes even benefit premium-
quality (mainstream-quality) national brands. However, Geyskens et al. (2010) suggest that 
their findings may not hold if manufacturers react to private labels by decreasing their 
prices or increasing their promotional activities, as this will modify the quality perception 
of their products, changing the performance implications of their brands. Given that during 
price wars many manufacturers cut their prices or discount their products more often, what 
will then be the consequences for national brands? How should retailers manage the 
promotion implementation tools (e.g. promotional calendar, depth of the discount) across 
their portfolio of private labels and national brands? 
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Hard discounters. Discount stores make strong gains in Europe (e.g. Aldi and 
Lidl), as well as in the USA (e.g. Save-A-Lot). In comparison to traditional retailers, their 
assortment is very limited (e.g. from a minimum of 800 SKUs at Aldi to more than 20.000 
in a typical outlet), as well as their selection of products (mainly focused on private labels). 
The increased acceptance and popularity of private labels (Geyskens et al. 2010) facilitates 
even further the growth of hard discounters. Between 2004 and 2009, their sales (in value) 
increased by 45% in the States, and by 40% in Europe (Planet Retail 2010). As this 
channel expands, it becomes even more appealing for national brands to reach those 
consumers that shop at discounters (Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). Moreover, the low 
number of national brands carried by the discounters increases the pressure for 
manufacturers to take action before their competitors, preventing them from occupying the 
limited space available on the discounters’ shelves. At the same time, the high competition 
across retailers pushes the discounters to ask national brands to sell their products in their 
stores, in order to increase their assortment variety and quality perception.  
Even though this is a growing phenomenon, to be the best of our knowledge, only 
the studies of Clareen et al. (2010), Deleersnyder et al. (2007) and Steenkamp and Kumar 
(2009) have so far focused on the (hard) discount phenomenon. However, there are several 
important issues that are still uncovered by the extant literature. For example, 
manufacturers are increasingly concerned that the sales realized through discounters may 
not come from new shoppers, but may be the result of cross-chain cannibalization. 
Similarly, also hard discounters are questioning the true benefits of national brands. In 
particular, they wonder whether they do significantly increase store traffic. As a 
consequence, some discounters have already started delisting them (IRI France 2009). If 
national brands do not attract new customers to discount stores, they may simply dilute 
existing consumers’ purchases across a higher number of SKUs. Given the higher price of 
national brands, this may significantly affect the sales of their private labels and/or of 
products in other categories. Nevertheless, Deleersnyder et al. (2007) find that it is better 
for discounters to keep a large price difference between the national brands and the 
discounters’ private labels (as both brands are targeted at different consumer segments or 
purchase occasions). Should then discounters offer more price promotions on national 
brands to stimulate traffic? Or would that be just a waste of money, as consumers may be 
drawn to national brands anyway? Moreover, while from the perspective of the retailer, 
promoting national brands at discounters may decrease sales of private labels inside the 
store, from the perspective of the manufacturer, it may as well induce higher levels of 
cross-chain cannibalization.  
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Furthermore, the presence of some national brands at hard discounters may lead 
all retailers and manufacturers to change their pricing and promotional strategies in order 
to keep the status quo. Traditional retailers may, for example, decide to lower the prices of 
the national brands, or offer more frequent/steeper promotions to prevent consumers from 
switching to discounters. Similar changes may be implemented by the manufacturers of 
brands not available at discounters, in order not to lose market share. Such changes may 
affect promotional effectiveness of every brand at rival retailers, and/or become an impetus 
for yet another price war among retailers. 
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SAMENVATTING: (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
Jaarlijks besteden fabrikanten en detaillisten een substantiel deel van hun 
marketing budget aan sales promotions. Het is daarom niet verwonderlijk dat veel 
academici zich hebben geconcentreerd op dit onderwerp. Het uitvoeren van promoties voor 
nationale merken gezamenlijk met detaillisten is een complexe taak in de hedendaagse 
competitieve markt. Een brand manager neemt beslissingen over welke vorm van 
promoties uit te voeren en op welk moment. Daarbij moet hij rekening houden met de 
gevolgen van de promoties niet alleen in een stabiele marktomgeving, maar ook tijdens een 
prijsoorlog, zowel bij de focale retailers als bij de concurrerende detaillisten. Eerdere 
studies zijn vooral gericht op het eerste aspect en geven brand managers inzicht welk merk 
beter verkoopt tijdens promoties en bij welke retailer. Echter, voor een specifiek merk 
kunnen managers nog steeds niet vaststellen hoeveel en welke promoties daadwerkelijk in 
staat zijn om de verkoop te laten toenemen. Wij vertrekken van de bestaande literatuur en 
breiden deze in drie richtingen uit door het identificeren van welke promoties een beter 
resultaat geven tijdens (1) stabiele marktomstandigheden, tijdens (2) een prijsoorlog, en (3) 
niet alleen bij de focale retailer, maar ook bij concurrerende retailers. 
In ons onderzoek introduceren we een nieuwe methode op basis van de 
intervention analysis van Leone (1987). Deze methode stelt ons in staat om op flexibele 
wijze het effect van individuele promoties vast te stellen en zodoende beter te begrijpen 
hoeveel promoties daadwerkelijk effectief zijn. In ons onderzoek vinden we dat ongeveer 
80% van de promoties in staat zijn om de verkopen van het merk aanzienlijk te doen 
toenemen bij de focale retailer. In vergelijking met een "gemiddelde-effect"-model, zoals 
het SCAN*PRO-model, krijgen we een meer gedetailleerd overzicht van wat echt werkt en 
wat niet. In een "gemiddelde-effect" model, zoals bij het SCAN*PRO-model, berekent de 
onderzoeker een gemiddelde coëfficiënt over verschillende promoties waardoor het aantal 
effectieve promoties niet geïdentificeerd kan worden. Onze meer verfijnde benadering 
biedt gedetailleerde inzichten in wat werkt en wat niet. Bijvoorbeeld: 
(1) Een niet-significante parameter in het SCAN*PRO-model geeft aan dat de 
promotionele activiteiten van dat merk niet in staat zijn om hogere verkopen 
te genereren. Met onze aanpak echter kunnen we vaststellen dat bijna 40% 
van deze promoties wél effectief zijn en resulteren in gemiste kansen als 
fabrikanten besluiten ze stop te zetten. 
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(2) In plaats daarvan zijn 13% van de merkpromoties waarvoor het SCAN*PRO 
model aangeeft dat het effectieve promoties zijn, weggegooid geld aangezien 
deze promoties niet in staat zijn om de verkoop significant te doen laten 
toenemen. 
(3) Slechts voor 17% van de merken zijn alle promoties daadwerkelijk in staat 
om de verkoop te stimuleren. 
Om deze redenen moeten managers verder kijken dan het gemiddelde effect van 
hun promotionele activiteiten voor een specifiek merk. Als ze het rendement van hun 
marketinguitgaven willen maximaliseren is het van belang voor hen om te begrijpen welke 
promotie beter werkt en waarom. Enkel kijkend naar het gemiddelde resultaat van 
promoties kan leiden tot gemiste kansen of weggegooid geld. Zoals eerder vermeld, indien 
promoties gemiddeld niet in staat zijn om de verkoop te stimuleren, betekent dit niet dat ze 
allemaal weggegooid geld zijn. 
Daarnaast vergelijken we de effectiviteit van de verkoopbevordering in een 
business-as-usual scenario met een prijsoorlogscenario. In dit proefschrift onderzoeken we 
de Nederlandse supermarktprijsoorlog welke in 2003 door de marktleider is ontketend. We 
dragen bij aan zowel de promotie- en prijsoorlogliteratuur door ons niet te richten op de 
gevolgen voor de initiatiefnemer van de prijsoorlog (detaillist) dan wel voor de andere 
direct betrokken partijen (andere detaillisten), maar we richten ons juist op de gevolgen 
voor een derde partij. In onze situatie is deze derde partij een merkartikelenfabrikant die 
gedwongen wordt om zijn producten af te zetten via een verkoopkanaal dat verwikkeld is 
een prijsoorlog. In het bijzonder laten we zien wat er gebeurt met de verkoop en promotie-
effectiviteit van een A-merk wanneer de prijs van het product door de detaillist wordt 
verlaagd (directe prijsoorlog) dan wel niet wordt verlaagd(indirecte prijsoorlog). In ons 
onderzoek vinden we dat fabrikanten hun prijzen en promotionele strategie zouden moet 
heroverwegen. Verlaging van de prijzen van hun merken helpt de verkopen en 
promotionele effectiviteit te verhogen. Omgekeerd, wanneer concurrerende merken hun 
prijzen verlagen terwijl het focale merk dit niet doet, zullen zowel de verkopen en 
promotionele effectiviteit afnemen. In beide scenario’s neemt de promotionele effectiviteit 
af over tijd. 
Verder vinden we dat de prijsoorlog de effectiviteit van instrumenten voor 
verkooppromoties verandert. Wanneer de prijs van het focale merk niet wordt verlaagd, 
zou de brand manager frequenter verkooppromoties moeten uitvoeren met hogere 
kortingen en ondersteunen met verkoopfolders. In feite, gezien het ongunstige relatieve 
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prijsbeeld (wanneer concurrenten hun prijzen verlagen), zullen zijn promoties minder 
effectief zijn en heeft het merk meer ondersteuning nodig om hetzelfde verkoopniveau 
gedurende de promotie te behouden. Als in plaats daarvan de prijs van het merk direct 
wordt verlaagd, zal de effectiviteit van in-store displays afnemen terwijl folders 
belangrijker worden om verkoop te stimuleren. In een prijsoorlog hebben consumenten de 
neiging om hun verkoopbeslissing te baseren op prijzen en folders vergemakkelijkt hun 
keuze daarin. Hoewel men om deze reden een toename in het belang van display 
communicatie zou verwachten, verlaagt het overmatig gebruik van displays bij tijdelijke en 
permanente prijsverlagingen hun doeltreffendheid. 
Tot slot richten we ons niet alleen op de effecten van verkooppromoties binnen de 
focal retailer, maar ook op die bij concurrerende detaillisten, een onderzoeksgebied dat 
grotendeels is genegeerd in de literatuur. Hoewel de cherry-picking literatuur concludeert 
dat in een bepaald marktsegment consumenten alleen in prijs verlaagde producten kopen 
en dusdanig hun winkelkeuze maken, is er beperkt onderzoek verricht naar de gevolgen 
van prijspromoties op concurrerende winkelketens. Vanuit het perspectief van de fabrikant 
is een promotie succesvol wanneer deze in staat is om verkoop op te tillen zonder de 
verkoop in concurrerende winkels te kannibaliseren. Daarom moet een fabrikant die via 
meerdere concurrerende winkelketens verkoopt gedegen aandacht besteden aan de 
gevolgen van zijn promoties niet alleen binnen de focal chain, maar ook de gevolgen voor 
concurrerende ketens. Doet hij dat niet, dan loopt hij de kans om de effectiviteit van de 
verkoopbevordering te overschatten en te negeren dat een deel van de incrementele 
verkooptoename ten koste gaat van verkoop bij andere ketens. Hoewel deze 
kannibaliseringseffecten onopgemerkt blijven binnen een individuele keten, worden ze 
significant wanneer gekeken wordt naar het totale effect over alle concurrerende ketens. 
Om mogelijke kannibalisering te voorkomen dienen fabrikanten een duidelijk inzicht te 
hebben in de positionering van de verschillende winkelketens. Inderdaad, we vinden dat de 
cross-chain effecten afhankelijk zijn van de winkelformule. Een winkelketen gekenmerkt 
door hoge prijzen en een hoog niveau van dienstverlening haalt minder klanten weg van 
concurrerende ketens met lage prijzen en laag niveau van dienstverlening. 
Tekenen van mogelijke kannibalisering zijn reeds duidelijk wanneer we kijken 
naar de determinanten van sales promoties in stabiele marktcondities, evenals tijdens een 
prijzenoorlog. In beide situaties wordt de effectiviteit van een promotie verlaagd wanneer 
deze gelijktijdig of kort op elkaar volgend plaatsvindt in concurrerende winkelketens. 
Echter, indien de prijs van het merk niet is verlaagd tijdens een prijsoorlog, zijn promoties 
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effectiever als ze vaker en kort na de promotie in een concurrerende keten worden 
uitgevoerd. 
Ten slotte biedt dit proefschrift een nieuwe manier om promotionele effectiviteit 
te meten. Middels dit proefschrift hopen we meer inzicht te hebben gekregen in welke 
promotie effectiever is en waarom dankzij het individuele promotiemodel dat wij hebben 
toegepast We bestudeerden de sales promoties niet alleen tijdens stabiele marktcondities, 
maar ook tijdens een grote verstoring in de markt, die van een prijzenoorlog. We toonden 
aan dat promoties op verschillende manieren moeten worden uitgevoerd in deze twee 
scenario's. Bovendien hebben we gewezen op de noodzaak om rekening te houden met 
factoren welke tot nu toe genegeerd zijn door de bestaande literatuur, zoals cross-chain 
effecten.
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Moderator analysis – Chapter 2 – full set of results (see Table 2.5) 
 
Dependent variable: TE* 
N = 519 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-value Two-sided 
p-value 
 μ1 INTERCEPT 11.831 2.170 .042 
 μ2 DR2 .900 1.440 .152 
 μ3 DR3 -2.443 -3.600 .000 
 μ4 DR4 -1.427 -1.900 .058 
 μ′2 DC2 -2.081 - .41 .682 
 μ′3 DC3  .07  .97 .332 
 μ′4 DC4 -6.912 1.51 .132 
 μ′5 DC5 1.15  .89 .374 
 μ′6 DC6 -2.98 1.12 .263 
 μ′7 DC7 -4.3 -1.23 .219 
 μ′8 DC8 -2.081 -1.39 .165 
    
PLANNING       
 β1 Log TIMING .440 1.800 .073 
 β2 Log TIMING_COMP .510 2.480 .014 
 β3 SIMULTANEOUS -1.264 -2.590 .010 
 β4 Log DEPTH .932 1.850 .065 
 β5 Log DURATION -1.770 -3.000 .003 
FRAMING (vs. pure price cut)       
 β6 QUANTITY -.056 -.080 .935 
 β7 LOYALTY -1.653 -1.010 .312 
 β8 OTHER 4.261 1.870 .062 
COMMUNICATION (vs. in-store shelf tag)       
 β9 FEATURE 1.496 2.950 .003 
 β10 DISPLAY 2.365 2.210 .027 
 β11 Log ADSTOCK -.001 -.030 .978 
CONTROL VARIABLE       
 β12 Log MKTSHARE -.900 -2.280 .023 
 β13 Log CONCENTRATION 5.032 2.420 .016 
 β14 Log INVENTORY -1.392 -1.480 .140 
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Appendix 2. Moderator analysis – Chapter 3 – full set of results (see Table 3.11) 
 
  Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value p-value 
 μ1 INTERCEPT 8.352 1.37 .171 
 μ2 DR2 -2.081 -2.41 .016 
 μ3 DR3 -2.042 -2.34 .020 
 μ4 DR4 -1.912 -2.23 .026 
 μ′2 DC2 -1.95 - .45 .650 
 μ′3 DC3 1.12 1.00 .318 
 μ′4 DC4 -5.831 - .94 .347 
 μ′5 DC5 1.23 1.23 .219 
 μ′6 DC6 -4.21 -1.36 .175 
 μ′7 DC7 -3.12 -1.49 .138 
 μ′8 DC8 -1.92 -1.20 .231 
PRICE WAR    
 γ1 INDIRECT_PW 1.142 3.11 0.002 
 γ2 DIRECT_PW 0.153 1.93 0.054 
 γ3 TIME_LAG_ INDIRECT_PW  -0.034 -2.25 0.001 
 γ4 TIME_LAG_DIRECT_ PW 0.015 3.73 <.0001 
CONTROL VARIABLES    
PLANNING       
ξ1 Log TIMING 1.213 3.98 <.0001 
 ξ2 Log TIMING_COMP  0.832 2.99 0.002 
 ξ3 SIMULTANEOUS  -0.783 -1.27 0.204 
 ξ4 Log DEPTH 0.945 2.54 0.011 
 ξ5 Log DURATION -1.219 -1.99 0.047 
COMMUNICATION (vs. in-store shelf tag) 
      
 ξ6 FEATURE 1.195 4.77 <.0001 
 ξ7 DISPLAY 1.436 3.18 0.001 
 ξ8 Log ADSTOCK -0.071 -0.82 0.412 
OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES 
      
 ξ9 Log MKTSHARE 0.671 0.44 0.660 
 ξ10 Log CONCENTRATION 2.719 1.97 0.049 
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Not All Promotions
are Made Equal
From the Effects of a Price War 
to Cross-chain Cannibalization
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FROM THE EFFECTS OF A PRICE WAR TO CROSS-CHAIN CANNIBALIZATION
Despite the huge amount of money allocated every year to sales promotions, brand
managers still do not know how often and in what circumstances promotions are truly
effective. This dissertation proposes an approach that allows managers to assess the
impact of individual promotion events rather than the average effect of total promotional
efforts. As such, more detailed information is gained on how promotions should be
implemented. 
Moreover, sales promotions are not only evaluated in a business-as-usual environment,
but their role and effectiveness during retailer induced price wars is also critically examined.
As retailer competition tends to degenerate more often into price wars, this research
offers recommendations to brand managers on whether they should accommodate
retailers’ wishes to lower regular, list prices rather than focusing on temporary promotions. 
Finally, a brand manufacturer, when planning his promotional events for a retailer,
should consider that a promotion can steal sales from rival supermarket chains. While
these cross-chain effects are often negligible for the retailer, they are quite substantial for
the manufacturer. Thus, to increase promotional effectiveness, a brand manager should
carefully plan the promotional calendar across rival retailers.
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